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THE RETURN OF REASONABLENESS:
SAVING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
FROM THE SUPREME COURT
Melanie D. Wilson†
I. INTRODUCTION
The term “reasonable” means rational, “[n]ot excessive or
extreme,”1 “not demanding too much.”2 Behaving reasonably,
therefore, requires conduct “[w]ithin the bounds of common sense.”3
The acts of a reasonable person are “not absurd”; they are “not
ridiculous.”4 Reasonable people act “by fair or sensible standards of
judgment; rightly or justifiably.”5
Although the Fourth Amendment centers on “reasonableness,” the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been anything but. A
prominent legal scholar once described the Court’s jurisprudence as
“an embarrassment.”6 As part of his explanation, he said:
[S]ensible rules that the Amendment clearly does lay down or
presuppose—that all searches and seizures must be
† Associate Professor, The University of Kansas School of Law, mdwilson@ku.edu. I
thank Fabio Arcila, Christopher R. Drahozal, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Wayne A. Logan, Paul
Marcus, Thomas G. Stacy, participants at the 2008 Midwest Law & Society Retreat, participants
of Central States 2008 Conference, and participants at an in-house faculty workshop for
thoughtful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article. This article was supported
in part by the University of Kansas General Research Fund, Number 2302144, for which I am
grateful. Thanks, finally, to the staff of Case Western Reserve Law Review for their detailed
and insightful edits and to my able research assistant, Chris Grenz.
1 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1031 (2d College ed., 1982).
2 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1892 (1981).
3 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1031.
4 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1892.
5 THE OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1132 (2002).
6 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757
(1994).
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reasonable . . . —are ignored by the Justices. Sometimes. The
result is a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not
merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse.
Criminals go free, while honest citizens are intruded upon in
outrageous ways with little or no real remedy. If there are
good reasons for these and countless other odd results, the
Court has not provided them.7
Maybe “embarrassment” is too harsh. But, when the Court
assesses “reasonableness,” the floor protection guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment,8 the Court has certainly rendered some
inconsistent, seemingly result-oriented, common-sense-defying
opinions9 that have, in effect, undermined the primary purpose of the
Amendment—to protect the people from undue government
intrusions on privacy and liberty.10
Id. at 758.
See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (describing reasonableness as
the “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment).
9 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 6, at 758 (“[T]he result [of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence] is a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and
contradictory, but often perverse.”); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504–05 nn.9–10 (2007) (citing numerous scholars who
criticize the Court’s jurisprudence and indicating that the “reasonable expectation of privacy
test” is a “mystery of Fourth Amendment law” and that “no one seems to know what makes an
expectation of privacy constitutionally ‘reasonable’”); Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 839, 840, 846 (2008) (noting “the dismay that can accompany class discussions about
warrantless perusal of personal bank records . . . or agents trespassing on private land” and
arguing that “[s]ometimes it appears that the Court is engaged in a form of outcome-based
jurisprudence, reaching a conclusion first and then reasoning backward to justify it. . . . More
generally, there is an ‘uncanny resemblance’ between the purported privacy expectations of
society and those of the Justices themselves, producing a most ‘self-indulgent test.’” (quoting
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring))); Janice Nadler, No Need to
Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (“[T]he
Court’s Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence is either based on serious errors about human
behavior and judgment, or else has devolved into a fiction of the crudest sort—a mere device for
attaining the desired legal consequence.”); Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable:
A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 774
(2005) (criticizing the Court’s consent jurisprudence and arguing, based on United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), that “[t]he idea that the[] defendants acted voluntarily is at once
absurd, meaningless, and irrelevant under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It is
absurd because no outsider viewing the interaction would conclude that the defendants
voluntarily consented to a search when surrounded by police at close quarters, especially if the
defendants knew (as they must have) that giving the consent would ultimately result in serious
criminal charges being filed against them.”); Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another
Look at Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 69 & n.1 (2007) (acknowledging that
“[n]o one seems to have a good word to say about [the Court’s] consent-search jurisprudence”
or its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally).
10 The Fourth Amendment provides:
7
8

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
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This Article contends that the Court’s most perplexing Fourth
Amendment outcomes occur in one category of Fourth Amendment
cases and that an additional faulty habit of the Court is exacerbating
the Court’s problematic results. More precisely, the integrity of the
Court’s cases suffers when Supreme Court Justices assess issues of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness by critiquing the “reasonable”
beliefs and actions of ordinary citizens (“citizen reasonableness”)—
issues that juries should decide.11 In addition, the Court sometimes
oversteps its traditional, law-declaring role12 to decide issues of pure
fact.
This Article ultimately proposes a solution that would more
accurately assess Fourth Amendment issues of citizen reasonableness
and restrict the Court’s evaluation of fact-laden Fourth Amendment
questions. At a minimum, the Supreme Court should acknowledge
distinct kinds of Fourth Amendment reasonableness: Legal
Reasonableness; Factual Reasonableness; and Mixed Reasonableness.
Legal Reasonableness includes Fourth Amendment issues that can
be fairly characterized as requiring a declaration of law. Factual
Reasonableness includes issues that require an assessment of who did
what and whom to believe. Finally, Mixed Reasonableness includes

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 Emory L. J. 1311,
1343 (1994) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s “malleable notion of [Fourth Amendment]
reasonableness” has in application “tended to defeat the core purposes of the Fourth
Amendment” by increasing government power to search and seize while shrinking individual
liberty and privacy).
11 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 65 (1895) (“[A]s, on the one hand, it is
presumed that juries are best judges of facts, it is, on the other hand, presumable that the courts
are the best judges of the law.”); see also Amar, supra note 6, at 761 (arguing that the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be altered “to draw[] on the participation and wisdom
of, ordinary citizens—We the People, who in the end must truly comprehend and respect the
constitutional rights enforced in Our name”); Ronald J. Bacigal, A Case for Jury Determination
of Search and Seizure Law, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 791, 825 (1981) [hereinafter Bacigal, A Case
for Jury] (“To the extent that the expression ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ connotes
common sense and community consensus, it is suggested that the jury can ‘do the job better.’”
(footnote and citation omitted)); Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth
Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 364 (1994) [hereinafter Bacigal, Putting the People
Back] (proposing a “structure for Fourth Amendment decisionmaking that returns the jury to its
former prominence”).
12 In this Article, law means general, legal rules. “Law consists of ‘those rules and
standards of general application by which the state regulates human affairs.’ These rules and
standards should be ‘generally and uniformly applicable to all persons of like qualities and
status and in like circumstances’ . . . .” Mark A. Bross, Comment, The Impact of Ornelas v.
United States on the Appellate Standard of Review for Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 874–75 (quoting Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56
HARV. L. REV. 899, 901, 904 (1943)).
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issues requiring the application of facts to law. The Supreme Court
should critically assess issues of Mixed Reasonableness to determine
whether a judge or jury is better-positioned to decide them fairly and
accurately. Some mixed issues should be assigned to a “government
subset” and others to a “citizen subset.” The government subset will
include “mixed” issues calling for the application of facts to law that
warrant broad, bright-line rules to guide the conduct of law
enforcement officers, as well as issues strongly tied to law
enforcement policies and procedures. In contrast, the citizen subset
should encompass mixed issues of fact and law that are heavily
dependent on the actions, beliefs, and perspectives of prudent,
ordinary citizens. Trial judges should continue to decide all issues
within the government subset, and the Supreme Court should review
the majority of these questions using a de novo appellate review. But
juries should resolve the issues in the citizen subset, and the Court
should review those jury determinations only for clear error. This
Article contends that this proposed change of process will return
some reasonableness and credibility to the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
A. Failings of the Court’s Assessment of Reasonableness.
The Fourth Amendment was not crafted to regulate the behaviors
and actions of the American people.13 Instead, it was created to
protect “the people,” their homes, and “effects” from unreasonable
searches and seizures by the police and other government agents.14
But, in giving meaning to the safeguards that the Fourth Amendment
assures, the United States Supreme Court has not only proclaimed
that law enforcement officers must act “reasonably” whenever they
search or seize,15 it has gone much further, demanding reasonableness

13 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (recognizing
that the Fourth Amendment “does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one,
effected by a private party on his own initiative”); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S 465, 475
(1921) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment protects only against “activities of sovereign
authority”).
14 In this regard, the text of the Fourth Amendment is straightforward. See U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (indicating that the Fourth
Amendment restraints apply to governmental acts, whether undertaken by civil or criminal
authorities); id. (stating that the “‘basic purpose of th[e Fourth] Amendment . . . is to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials’”
(quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967))); Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475 (noting
that “the purpose of the Fourth Amendment [was] to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property”).
15 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (describing reasonableness as
the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment”).
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from citizens16 too.17 In this vein, the Court has routinely evaluated
the “reasonableness” of drivers, passengers, employees, suspects, and
others who interact with police.18 When ordinary citizens are
approached by the police, the Court requires them to behave as a
hypothetical “reasonable” man19 in similar circumstances “would
have” behaved. If the Court decides that a person has not met
the Court’s idiosyncratic expectations of “objective” citizen
reasonableness, the Court declares that the citizen lacks Fourth
Amendment protection. Thus, when five or more Justices conclude
that a driver, passenger, employee, or other citizen acted with less
savvy, intellect, or fortitude than the “reasonable person” should, the
Court holds that the person and his belongings were never “seized,”
that there was no “search,” or that the citizen “consented” to the
16 The reference to “citizens” in this Article is not intended to distinguish American
citizens, born or naturalized, from undocumented persons or “aliens.” It is intended to
differentiate government actors from non-government persons.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203–05 (2002) (evaluating the
reasonable beliefs and actions of a commercial bus passenger); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
212, 218–20 (1984) (assessing the reasonable behaviors and beliefs of factory workers who
were subject to police interrogation while confined by their work duties and holding that such
workers were not “seized”); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (explaining
that a person is “seized” when “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”); see also Christopher
Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted
by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (“[I]f one takes the Justices at their word, a sense of
how (innocent) U.S. citizens gauge the impact of police investigative techniques on their
privacy and autonomy is highly relevant to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
18 See supra note 17; see also Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007) (evaluating
whether a reasonable automobile passenger would feel free to terminate the encounter with
police when the car in which he is riding is subjected to a traffic stop); Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (considering whether a reasonable bus passenger would feel free to
“‘disregard the police and go about his business’” (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 628 (1991))); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (analyzing whether installation of a
pen register constitutes a search, and hinging the analysis on whether the person who was
subject to the pen register exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and whether
the individual’s expectation of privacy was one that society would recognize as reasonable).
19 The reference to a male person is not accidental. The Court claims to apply an
“objective” reasonable person test. This test appears to assume, however, that everyone,
regardless of age, gender, race, intellectual ability, or ethnicity, should conform his or her
behavior to that of a “reasonable” white male. See Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Permeation of Race,
National Origin and Gender Issues from Initial Law Enforcement Contact Through Sentencing:
The Need for Sensitivity, Equalitarianism and Vigilance in the Criminal Justice System, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1153, 1155 n.5 (1994) (asserting a problem with the Fourth Amendment
reasonable person test, explaining that “in applying an objective reasonable person test, [the
Court] may be applying a test reflective of the reasonable white male law-abiding citizen, rather
than a test truly reflective of the reasonable African-American, Hispanic, or Asian-American
citizen”); see also Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in
Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437,
439 (1988) (contending that the Supreme Court has “construct[ed] a highly artificial
‘reasonable person’ who is much more assertive in encounters with police officers than is the
average citizen”).
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search or seizure. Once the Court finds that the government neither
searched nor seized, it resolves that the government did not infringe a
Fourth Amendment interest in privacy, liberty, or personal security,
concluding that Fourth Amendment rights never attached.
In addition to evaluating the conduct and beliefs of citizens, the
Supreme Court is prone to re-assess facts already decided in the
courts below. Juries routinely decide questions of fact in both civil
and criminal cases,20 but in Fourth Amendment matters, trial judges
decide all issues, whether of fact, law, or a mixture of both. And,
although the Supreme Court has consistently articulated a willingness
to defer to the judge’s assessment of facts, announcing that it will
review such findings only for clear error,21 in reality, the Court
sometimes reviews facts de novo. Because the Justices are not present
to see, hear, and receive factual evidence first-hand, the Court’s cases
appear result-oriented when the Court re-assesses facts that were
decided by decision makers who did see and hear the evidence.
B. A Proposal.
This Article urges a re-evaluation of who should conduct Fourth
Amendment reasonableness assessments and contends that juries of
reasonable citizens, not Supreme Court Justices, should decide issues
of citizen reasonableness. Thus, the Supreme Court will take its first
step toward returning reasonableness to its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence when it: 1) Allows juries to decide those “mixed”
questions of Fourth Amendment law that require an evaluation of
how reasonable citizens think and behave,22 and 2) Enforces a
fact/law dichotomy in which the Court restricts its assessment of
Fourth Amendment facts to a clear-error, deferential review.
To promote the proposed approach, the Supreme Court should
divide Fourth Amendment issues into distinct groups and assign
whole groups to judges or juries, depending on which body is
best-suited to decide the entire group. Using its current balancing
formula,23 the Court should continue to decide those types of issues
20 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 64, 66–67, 84–86 (1895); U.S. Const. Amend.
VII; discussion infra note 29 and accompanying text.
21 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996).
22 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (indicating that generally the Supreme
Court’s designation of issues as fact questions or mixed questions “has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question”); see also Bacigal, A Case for Jury,
supra note 11, at 824–25 (“To the extent that the expression ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
connotes common sense and community consensus, it is suggested that the jury can ‘do the job
better.’” (footnote and citation omitted)).
23 The Court “‘assess[es], on the one hand, the degree to which [a search or seizure]
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that require the declaration of general principles of law and those that
turn on broad policy judgments about the protections the Fourth
Amendment does and does not offer. It should also decide those
issues requiring an evaluation of how reasonable law enforcement
officers act given specific facts and circumstances. But the Court
should defer to citizen juries on issues of how reasonable citizens
think and behave, and to fact-finding bodies on issues of fact and on
questions that hinge on the credibility of witnesses. Sometimes, the
fact-finding body will be a judge (as it currently is in all Fourth
Amendment cases); other times, a jury should be impaneled to
evaluate fact-laden issues.24
Even though judges currently decide all Fourth Amendment
suppression issues, there are persuasive arguments for permitting
juries to decide at least some Fourth Amendment questions.25 The
reasons are particularly strong for allowing juries of reasonable
citizens to assess the actions and beliefs of other “reasonable”
citizens.
Allowing juries to decide citizen reasonableness may result in
more substantive Fourth Amendment protection for the American
people by reducing the number of cases in which the beliefs of
seemingly reasonable people are declared to be unreasonable.26 If, for
instance, juries prove to be more likely to find that a reasonable
person in a suspect’s circumstances would feel obligated to answer
police questions or constrained to reject a law enforcement officer’s
requests to search his or her person or belongings, then the number of
Fourth Amendment rights-protecting cases will increase, and the

intrudes upon an individual’s privacy [or liberty] and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001)).
24 See Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 38–39 (2006).
Three traditional reasons have been given for favoring jury determinations.
First, juries are good at finding facts: twelve people who listen to evidence and then
deliberate together over what they have heard are more likely to get things right than
is a single fact-finder deciding an issue alone. Second, juries, particularly in criminal
cases, serve as a check on the government: criminal juries watch out for the rights
and interests of the individual defendant, and, as a result, safeguard liberty . . . .
Third, juries legitimize outcomes: the general public is more likely to respect
decisions reached by ordinary citizens.
Id.
See Bacigal, A Case for Jury, supra note 11, at 824–25.
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 17, at 740, 742 (revealing empirical data
suggesting that ordinary citizens consider certain law enforcement infringements on their
privacy and autonomy highly intrusive, while the Supreme Court’s rulings about the same
conduct assert minimal intrusiveness).
25
26
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Fourth Amendment will provide greater protection for the individual.
But even if juries comprised of ordinary citizens raise or maintain the
standards for citizen reasonableness, the Court’s process will
improve. At a minimum, allowing juries to decide these issues will
promote a respect for the Court’s cases by: 1) Reducing the
appearance that the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions are
result-oriented; 2) Increasing the transparency and democracy of the
process by including “the people” in Fourth-Amendment-rightsprotection; and 3) Lending some integrity to all rulings that label
citizen conduct or expectations as “unreasonable.”27
Nay-sayers to this proposed change in process are sure to criticize
the proposal as undermining predictability for law enforcement
officers, who must fulfill a duty of crime prevention and resolution,
while trying to comply with the Fourth Amendment. But
predictability is not mandated by the Fourth Amendment. Although
predictability of Fourth Amendment rules is, admittedly, a worthy
goal, the Constitution does not suggest that predictability trumps
individual rights. Furthermore, as the Court’s past decisions illustrate,
except when the Court declares broad, bright-line rules identifying the
reasonableness floor, no matter who evaluates reasonableness, the
process involves subjectivity and an inherent unpredictability,
because it demands an assessment of the unique circumstances of
each case.28 Therefore, there may be no significant increase in the
unpredictable outcomes when fact finders (including juries) are
substituted for appellate judges.
Furthermore, the proposed change in process will not inhibit the
Supreme Court from continuing to provide extensive guidance to the
police by announcing bright-line, black-letter rules of law declaring
the floor protections the Fourth Amendment guarantees. Such
straight-forward rules will continue to provide predictability and
uniformity in Fourth Amendment cases that do not rest on highly factspecific situations or hinge on the perspectives of ordinary people.
Finally, because the proposal argues that the Court should continue to
27 See Simmons, supra note 9, at 775 (“It is no exaggeration to say that the nearly
unanimous condemnation of the Court's rulings on consensual searches is creating a problem of
legitimacy which threatens to undermine the integrity of judicial review of police behavior.”).
28
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the difficulty in quantifying the abstract
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. It has said: “Though there has been
general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the
abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines for
the decision of particular cases is a difficult task . . . .” Camera v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967). The Court has also said, “Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails.” Id. at 536–37.
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assess, de novo, issues of law enforcement reasonableness, and issues
turning on how reasonable officers behave in response to specific
factual catalysts, the Court will continue to provide bright-line rules
in many cases. The proposal will impact only the small percentage of
cases that assess citizen behaviors and beliefs, and it is those cases
that deserve a change in process because they currently defy logic and
common sense.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVALUATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
REASONABLENESS.
Historically, juries have decided questions of fact in both criminal
and civil cases.29 In contrast, judges, particularly appellate judges,
have announced general principles of law.30 Consistent with the
fact-finder role for juries and the separate, law-declarer role for
judges, “appellate courts ‘accep[t] findings of fact that are not

29 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 64, 66–67, 84–86 (1895) (recounting Chief
Justice Jay and Chief Justice Marshall’s view that “the [C]ourt could speak authoritatively as to
the law, while the function of the jury was to respond as to the facts”); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States . . . .”); Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 444–45 (2001) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“‘An essential characteristic of [the federal court] system is the manner in which, in
civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the
influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed
questions of fact to the jury.’” (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432
(1996))); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (reiterating, in the context of
sentencing, that “‘under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt’” (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)));
Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 131 (2000) (noting, in the context of interpreting a
federal statute to determine the meaning of the term “machine gun,” that “if after considering
traditional interpretive factors, we were left genuinely uncertain as to Congress’ intent in this
regard, we would assume a preference for traditional jury determination of so important a
factual matter”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
30 Sparf, 156 U.S. at 64 (observing that “‘on questions of law it is the province of the
court to decide’” (quoting Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794))); see also Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”). Law scholars have added that “[l]aw declaration
involves ‘formulating a proposition [that] affects not only the [immediate] case . . . but all others
that fall within its terms.’” Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
229, 235 (1985) (brackets and ellipses in original) (quoting HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
374–75 (tentative ed. 1958)).
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“clearly erroneous.”’”31 But reviewing courts “‘decid[e] questions of
law de novo.’”32
Generally, mixed questions, those requiring an application of facts
to known or developing legal principles,33 have been more difficult
for the Court to assign. The Court has treated mixed questions
inconsistently, sometimes allowing juries to decide them, other times
reviewing the issues de novo, “depending upon essentially practical
considerations.”34
In deciding Fourth Amendment issues, however, the Court has not
adhered to its usual method of allocating issues between judges and
juries. The Court treats Fourth Amendment cases differently in two
significant ways. First, the Court decides all mixed questions35
without considering whether a fact finder could do a better job.
Second, the Court reviews some issues of pure fact, de novo, as if
they were legal issues. Because both types of issues—fact and
mixed—turn on fact-laden, circumstance-specific factors, the Court’s
case outcomes often appear result-oriented.36 And, by refusing to
assign some mixed issues to juries, the Court has failed to follow its
31 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995)) (brackets in original) (stating that
reviewing courts should review findings of historical fact only for clear error); see also
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991) (“[P]ure issue[s] of fact are subject to review
under a deferential standard . . . .”); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287–88 (1982)
(noting that in the civil context, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demands a
clearly erroneous standard for pure questions of fact); United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949,
953 (6th Cir. 2007) (reiterating that when reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an
appellate court reviews a district court’s legal determinations “de novo” but sets aside the trial
court’s factual findings “only if they are clearly erroneous” (citing United States v. Long, 464
F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006))).
32 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995)) (brackets in original).
33 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110 (1995) (“‘So-called mixed questions of fact
and law [are those] which require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact
determinations.’” (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963))).
34 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The Court has] in the past
reviewed some mixed questions of law and fact on a de novo basis, and others on a deferential
basis . . . .”). “[T]here is no rigid rule with respect to mixed questions.” Id. at 701.
35 See, e.g., id. at 697, 699 (majority opinion) (holding that determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause will be reviewed de novo by the Court); Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593, 604–05 (1927) (finding that issue of whether, given all of the circumstances, seizure
was authorized by applicable treaty “was for the judgment of the trial court,” not a jury); Steele
v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 506, 510–11 (1925) (rejecting the defendant’s argument in favor
of allowing a jury to decide whether “there was probable cause to issue the warrant”); see also
Bacigal, Putting the People Back, supra note 11, at 382 (discussing “the Court’s somewhat
illusory distinction between law and fact”).
36 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 9, at 846 (“[T]he Court is engaged in a form of outcomebased jurisprudence, reaching a conclusion first and then reasoning backward to justify it.”);
Nadler, supra note 9, at 156 (“[T]he Court’s Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence is either
based on serious errors about human behavior and judgment, or else has devolved into a fiction
of the crudest sort—a mere device for attaining the desired legal consequence.”).
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own practice of assigning issues to the decision maker best-positioned
to do a good job.
A. The Court Decides All Mixed Questions, Including Law
Enforcement Reasonableness and Citizen Reasonableness.
The Court has described “mixed” questions as those in which
“‘[t]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is
undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant]
statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way,
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or
is not violated.’”37 Like fact finding, “law application is
situation-specific.”38 In non-Fourth Amendment contexts, the
Supreme Court has sometimes said that mixed “question[s] of fact
and law [are] for the court and not for the jury.”39 In other cases, the
Court has contradicted that rule. In Sparf v. United States, the Court
expressly recognized a role for fact finders, including juries, in
deciding mixed questions, commenting:
[T]he jury must of necessity often pass upon a question,
‘compounded of fact and law,’ their duty, when considering
the evidence, was to apply the law, as given by the court, to
the facts proved, and, thus applying the law, return a verdict
of guilty or not guilty as their consciences might direct.40
In any event, juries do decide mixed issues in non-Fourth Amendment
contexts. For instance, juries decide issues of negligence, and juries
decide whether a criminal defendant reasonably believed that
imminent danger supported an act of self defense.41
37 Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696–97 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289,
n.19 (1982)) (second and third brackets original); see also Thompson, 516 U.S. at 110 (1995)
(“‘So-called mixed questions of fact and law [are those] which require the application of a legal
standard to the historical-fact determinations.’” (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309 n.6
(1963))); Monaghan, supra note 30, at 236 (“Law application . . . involves relating the legal
standard of conduct to the facts established by the evidence.”).
38 Monaghan, supra note 30, at 236.
39 Steele, 267 U.S. at 511.
40 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 67 (quoting with approval comments of Chief
Justice Marshall); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (providing statutorily that in habeas
corpus setting, state-court findings of fact are due great deference); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990) (“[C]onsiderations involved in the Rule 11 context are similar
to those involved in determining negligence, which is generally reviewed deferentially.”);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (addressing findings of intent to
discriminate as subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review).
41 One legal scholar, Erik Luna, contends that juries routinely decide mixed questions.
According to Luna, “juries inevitably interpret the law in every case, regardless of whether
officials acknowledge this bit of realism. Not only is the fact-law divide ‘a fiction that seldom
corrals the behavior of actual jurors,’” but it is “‘a gross oversimplification of our trial system.’”
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But in Fourth Amendment cases the Court reserves all mixed
questions for itself. For example, the Court treats the inquiry into the
voluntariness of someone’s consent as a purely legal question for de
novo review by the Court.42 Likewise, the Court has declared that
“the competency of the evidence of seizure under [a] search warrant”
is a mixed question appropriate for its de novo review.43 And, the
Court has held that “determinations of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal” because they
are mixed questions.44 Accordingly, in Fourth Amendment
suppression cases, neither fact-finding judges nor citizen juries are
ever permitted to definitively decide issues of reasonableness. In fact,
juries are excluded altogether from Fourth Amendment suppression
decisions.
1. The Court decides mixed questions of police reasonableness and
probable cause.
In giving meaning to the safeguards that the Fourth Amendment
assures, the Supreme Court has proclaimed that law enforcement
officers must act reasonably whenever they search or seize.45 Thus,

Luna, supra note 9, at 857 (quoting JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 64 (1994); RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY
SYSTEM 64 (2003)), (providing a string of citations to law review articles discussing the jury’s
role in finding facts and determining law); see also Bacigal, A Case for Jury, supra note 11, at
794–808; Bacigal, Putting the People Back, supra note 11, at 364–80.
42 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (analyzing the voluntariness of a
defendant’s consent to search); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116–17 (asserting in a
non-Fourth Amendment criminal procedure context that “assessments of credibility and
demeanor are not crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’” and
that a “state-court judge is not in an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to
make that determination”).
43 Steele, 267 U.S. at 506, 511 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a jury should
decide whether “there was probable cause to issue the warrant”); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S.
593, 605 (holding that issue of whether seizure was authorized by applicable treaty “was for the
judgment of the trial court,” not a jury).
44 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). Although the Court treats the
evaluation of reasonable suspicion as a mixed issue, the Court has simultaneously urged a
hybrid appellate review for these questions. In this regard, the Court has said that a reviewing
court must still “give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and
local law enforcement officers” when it conducts its “de novo” review. Id.; see also United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002) (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, with
approval). Notice, the Court has never said that deference of any sort is due the inferences that
suspects and citizens draw from their circumstances.
45 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (describing reasonableness as
the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment”); see also Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct.
1989, 1993 (2007) (per curiam) (finding that a law enforcement officer acted reasonably, as
required by the Fourth Amendment, although he ordered naked people out of bed in the process
of executing a search warrant); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2007) (finding that an
officer acted reasonably, as required by the Fourth Amendment, when he rammed the bumper of
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when an officer applies physical force to a person, executes a search
warrant, searches a suspect’s home or body, conducts a traffic stop or
a “Terry” frisk, she must behave “reasonably,” as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.46 The Court also decides how much evidence equates
to probable cause or reasonable suspicion when deciding whether a
search or seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment.47
(a) Police reasonableness.
Two recent cases—Brigham City v. Stuart48 and Los Angeles
County v. Rettele49—typify how the Court decides mixed questions of
police reasonableness. In Stuart the Court responded to a split in the
federal circuits by announcing a new, general principle of law:
“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to
render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an
occupant from imminent injury.”50 But the Court did not stop there. It
also declared that the officers’ particular conduct fell within the ambit
of the newly-announced rule. After repeating some of the facts from
the trial-court record,51 the Court drew inferences from those facts,
including: “In these circumstances, the officers had an objectively
reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need
help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.”52 The
Court decided: “Here, the officers were confronted with ongoing
violence occurring within the home.”53 Thus, concluded the
Court, “the officers’ entry here was plainly reasonable under the
circumstances.”54

a fleeing motorist, causing the car to spin out of control); Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (evaluating
an officer’s search of a parolee without a warrant or probable cause to determine if the officer
acted reasonably); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated if law enforcement officers reasonably believe that a third party
without power to consent maintained actual authority to permit search).
46 See cases cited supra note 45; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
47
See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
48 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
49 127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007) (per curiam).
50 547 U.S. at 403.
51 The basic facts of the case were these: At 3:00 a.m., four officers responded to a call
complaining about a loud party. Id. at 406. Once at the home, the officers heard shouting inside
and walked to the backyard to look through a screen door and windows to investigate further.
Id. In the kitchen, they saw an altercation involving four adults and a juvenile. Id. The adults
were attempting to restrain the young person, but the juvenile “[broke] free,” swung a fist and
“[struck] one of the adults in the face.” Id. Once the officers saw the altercation, an officer
entered the house through an open screen door, calling out his presence as he entered. Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 405.
54 Id. at 406.
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Even more recently, in Los Angeles County v. Rettele,55 the Court
decided that officers acted reasonably when they obtained and
executed a warrant to search a house for suspects who had vacated the
home three months earlier, even though in executing the warrant
officers ordered innocent residents (of a race different than the
suspects) out of bed, making them stand nude for several minutes.56
In ruling that the officers acted reasonably, the Court reversed a
decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had held that
“‘a
reasonable
jury
could
conclude
that
the
search and detention were “unnecessarily painful, degrading, or
prolonged.”’”57 In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions, the
Supreme Court drew competing inferences from the same facts in the
record. The Court seemed to visualize a reasonable explanation for
the officers’ flawed search, declaring:
The presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not
eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there as well.
As the deputies stated in their affidavits, it is not uncommon
in our society for people of different races to live together.
Just as people of different races live and work together, so too
might they engage in joint criminal activity.58
As the Court’s opinions in Stuart and Rettele show, the Court
regularly evaluates the reasonableness of police conduct to determine
if the Fourth Amendment was breached. In undertaking this analysis,
the Court engages in the type of fact-to-law application that in other
legal contexts the Court divides between judges and juries, depending
essentially on who is in the better position to decide the issues
accurately and fairly.59

127 S. Ct. 1989 (2007) (per curiam).
Id. at 1990, 1994.
57 Rettele v. Los Angeles County, 186 Fed. App’x 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)).
58 Rettele, 127 S. Ct. at 1992. The Court also remarked: “The orders by the police to the
occupants, in the context of this lawful search, were permissible, and perhaps necessary, to
protect the safety of the deputies.” Id. at 1993.
59 The Court’s active assessment of mixed Fourth Amendment issues is not new. See, e.g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1968) (finding that the “Fourth Amendment governs
‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house,” that “whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that
person,” and that the officer in that particular case, Officer McFadden, acted reasonably when
he forcibly stopped the suspect and searched his outer clothing).
55
56
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(b) Probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court also decides whether a search or seizure was
supported by the requisite evidence, reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. The Court assesses the sufficiency of the evidence using a
reasonable-citizen yardstick. The Court has described “reasonable
suspicion” as “an objective standard,” which asks “would the facts
available to [an] officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action
taken was appropriate?”60 Although the standard considers how an
ordinary citizen “of reasonable caution” would view the evidence, it
also takes into account “the circumstances [of the officer].”61
The probable cause standard is similar to reasonable suspicion in
that it restricts officers from searching or seizing without a reasonable
basis.62 The Court has said, “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts
and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’
an offense has been or is being committed.”63 The Court has admitted
experiencing difficulty in quantifying probable cause, remarking:
“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and
depends on the totality of the circumstances.”64 Unable to quantify the
term in percentages, the Court has described probable cause as “a
‘“practical, nontechnical conception”’ that deals with ‘“the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”’”65 Justice Scalia has
expressly acknowledged the “extremely fact-bound nature” of
60 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 21–22, 27 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (stating that when deciding whether or not reasonable suspicion supports
a limited “Terry frisk” or “Terry stop,” the Court inquires “whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances [of the officer] would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.”).
61 Id. at 21–22.
62 In fact, Fourth Amendment reasonableness is often equated with probable cause. See
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (“In the criminal context, reasonableness
usually requires a showing of probable cause.”). A warrant issues only upon a showing of
probable cause. See Groh v Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). And, most searches and
seizures (including arrests) require probable cause to comply with the Fourth Amendment. See
Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631–32 (2003) (noting that arrests require probable cause or
judicial authorization).
63 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (alterations in original).
64 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
232 (1983); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
65 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at
175–76)).
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probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations.66 Former
Chief Justice Taft, too, noted that probable cause assessments involve
extensive “issue[s] of fact.”67
Despite the admittedly nebulous, non-technical, fact-bound nature
of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause benchmarks, which
are judged from the perspectives of prudent men, not prudent jurists,
the Supreme Court evaluates these mixed issues de novo.68
2. The Court decides mixed questions of citizen reasonableness too.
In addition to evaluating the actions of police to decide whether
the government has breached the Fourth Amendment and whether
officers based their search or seizure on sufficient evidence, the
Supreme Court decides some Fourth Amendment cases by critiquing
citizen behaviors and beliefs for reasonableness (“citizen
reasonableness”). Arguably, the Supreme Court should not be
assessing citizen reasonableness at all. The text of the Fourth
Amendment demands reasonableness only from government actors.69
But the Court’s legal precedent in this area is well-established,
requiring someone to evaluate citizen thoughts and actions for
reasonableness.70 Therefore, the relevant question becomes—who
should conduct the evaluation and decide how rational citizens think
and behave when approached and questioned by police?
An average person who hears that she must act “reasonably”
probably thinks that she should act sensibly, prudently, and with the
common sense, care, and deliberation that a typical, thoughtful person
confronted with similar circumstances would and should use.71 In the
Fourth Amendment context, acting sensibly and prudently may not be
enough to protect your rights.72 Although the United States Supreme
66 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s holding that probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations
should be reviewed de novo on appeal).
67 See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1925).
68 See, for example, Pringle, 540 U.S. at 367–68, in which the Supreme Court held that
there was probable cause to arrest Pringle, who was one of three men riding in a car stopped for
speeding. Pringle was riding in a front passenger seat. An officer found cash in the car’s glove
compartment and five glassine baggies of cocaine in a back-seat armrest. Id. The officer
arrested the driver, Pringle, and a back-seat passenger. Id.
69 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
70 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); discussion infra Part
II.A.2.(a).(i).
71 See THE OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1132 (defining
“reasonably” as “in a fair and sensible way—by fair or sensible standards of judgment; rightly
or justifiably”). When “reasonableness” is judged by a typical American citizen, the standard is
no slouch—one empirical study indicates that typical citizens hold other citizens to high
standards. See Nadler, supra note 9, at 155–56.
72 The Supreme Court’s standards of reasonableness in consent cases are virtually
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Court purports to require this sort of common-sense reasonableness,73
in applying this standard to citizens and suspects, the Court condemns
many actions and beliefs that seem perfectly sensible to ordinary
citizens. 74
When citizens are approached by the police, the Court evaluates
their behaviors and beliefs using an “objective” measure of
reasonableness. Although the Court has said that a suspect’s unique
circumstances might matter in the reasonableness calculation,75 in
practice, any frailties they suffer from rarely count. As Professor
Tracey Maclin contends, there is no “average, hypothetical person.”76
Race, education, sophistication, culture, age, and infinite other factors
affect how prudent people behave. Nevertheless, if, and usually when,
the Court decides that a suspect or defendant has failed to satisfy the
Court’s expectations of citizen reasonableness, the Court declares that
the citizen lacks any Fourth Amendment protection. The Court holds

impossible to meet:
Ever since the Court first applied the ‘totality of the circumstances’ standard to
consent search issues in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte in 1973, it has held in case after
case, with only a few exceptions, that a reasonable person in the situation in question
either would feel free to terminate the encounter with police, or would feel free to
refuse the police request to search. By contrast, empirical studies over the last several
decades on the social psychology of compliance, conformity, social influence, and
politeness have all converged on a single conclusion: the extent to which people feel
free to refuse to comply is extremely limited under situationally induced pressures.
Nadler, supra note 9, at 155 (footnote omitted).
73 See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2007) (describing as “sensible”
a reasonable car passenger’s belief that he is not free to come and go during a traffic stop).
Interestingly, the Brendlin case is one of the few in which the Court concluded that the
defendant had fulfilled the hypothetical-person standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), discussed infra Part II.A.2.(a).(i);
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), discussed infra pp. Part II.A.2.(a).(iii); and INS
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
74 See Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme
Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 27–28 (2008) (noting the bewilderment of law students each
semester when they learn how the Supreme Court has interpreted voluntariness in the Fourth
Amendment context). I, too, have experienced this student surprise in every semester I have
taught Fourth Amendment law. Students seem shocked at the fortitude the Court expects of
typical citizens. One of my students asked, “Shouldn’t the Court presume that a person acted
reasonably, in the absence of other evidence?” See also Nadler, supra note 9; Slobogin &
Schumacher, supra note 17, at 739 (outlining the results of an empirical study finding citizen
disagreement with the holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the types of police investigative
actions that implicate privacy or autonomy).
75
See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (indicating that the facts that suspect was young,
black, and had not graduated from high school “were not irrelevant” but neither were they
decisive).
76
Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters” — Some Prelinimary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Va. U. L. Rev. 243, 248 (1991)
[hereinafter Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”].
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that the person and his belongings were never “seized” or that the
citizen “consented” to a search.77 Once the Court finds that the
government neither searched nor seized, it resolves that the
government did not infringe upon a Fourth Amendment interest in
privacy, liberty, or personal security, and concludes that the Fourth
Amendment was never implicated.
The Court directly and expressly assesses citizen reasonableness
when it decides whether a person was “seized” by police. In addition,
the Court implicitly considers the perspectives of ordinary citizens in
two other types of Fourth Amendment cases: 1) those assessing
whether a “search” occurred; and 2) those in which the police contend
that consent authorized a search. The Court decides all three types of
issues, treating them as purely legal questions.
(a) The Court decides when a citizen is seized.
Three cases—United States v. Mendenhall,78 Brendlin v.
California,79 and United States v. Drayton80—illustrate the Justices’
scrutiny of ordinary citizens when the Court decides whether a person
is “seized.”
(i) Sylvia Mendenhall, not a reasonable suspect.
In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court was asked to decide
whether officers had sufficient reason to detain a twenty-two-year-old
black female, Sylvia Mendenhall.81 Mendenhall flew from Los
Angeles to the Detroit airport on a commercial flight.82 Once inside
the airport, two white male Drug Enforcement Agency agents
approached her, identified themselves as law enforcement agents,
asked for her identification and her plane ticket, posed a few more
questions, and then asked Mendenhall to accompany them to a more

77 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (evaluating the reasonable
beliefs and actions of a commercial bus passenger); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212, 218–20
(1984) (assessing the reasonable behaviors and beliefs of factory workers who were subject to
police interrogation while confined by their work duties and holding that such workers were not
“seized”); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (explaining that a person is “seized” when “in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave”).
78 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
79 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007).
80 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
81 446 U.S. at 547.
82 Id.
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isolated room in the terminal.83 The agents suspected Mendenhall of
illegally transporting drugs.84
To answer Fourth Amendment issues, two Justices, Stewart and
Rehnquist, analyzed whether Mendenhall was “seized.”85 In doing so,
Justice Stewart explained: “As long as the person to whom questions
are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there
has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would
under the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification.”86 Justice Stewart emphasized that “a person has been
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”87 After
providing this explanation, Justice Stewart implicitly found that, if
Mendenhall subjectively felt constrained by the DEA agents, her
reaction was “unreasonable.”
On the facts of this case, no “seizure” of [Mendenhall]
occurred. The events took place in the public concourse. The
agents wore no uniforms and displayed no weapons. They did
not summon [Mendenhall] to their presence, but instead
approached her and identified themselves as federal agents.
They requested, but did not demand to see [Mendenhall]’s
identification and ticket. Such conduct, without more, did not
amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected
interest. [Mendenhall] was not seized simply by reason of the
fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would
show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a
few questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure that
the person asking the questions was a law enforcement
official.88
Id. at 548.
Id. at 547.
85 Because the Fourth Amendment is only implicated during a search or seizure, this was a
threshold issue. Three of the Justices—Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice
Powell—did not reach the seizure issue. Id. at 560–66 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
86 Id. at 554 (Part II-A, opinion of Justice Stewart, joined only by Justice Rehnquist).
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 555. In dissent, Justice White emphasized that the Supreme Court was the first to
decide that Mendenhall was not “seized.” Justice White explained:
83
84

There is no indication that the Government on appeal, before either the original
panel of the Court of Appeals or the en banc court, ever questioned the
understanding that the stop of Ms. Mendenhall constituted a “seizure” requiring
reasonable suspicion. Neither the majority of the en banc court nor the dissenting
judge questioned the District Court’s acknowledgment that reasonable suspicion was
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Accordingly, two of the nine justices undertook their own
evaluation of Mendenhall’s behavior and beliefs, deciding that she
was never “seized” and, therefore, lacked protection from the Fourth
Amendment.89 After the decision in Mendenhall, the Court adopted
Justice Stewart’s test as determinative of when a citizen is seized.90
(ii) Bruce Brendlin, a reasonable car passenger.
Recently, in Brendlin v. California, the Court ensured Fourth
Amendment protection for car passengers when it decided how
reasonable car passengers feel and react during traffic stops. The
Court decided, as a matter of law, that a passenger is “seized”
whenever a law enforcement officer subjects the car in which she is
riding to a traffic stop.91 To reach this conclusion, the Court applied

required to justify the initial stop of Ms. Mendenhall.
Id. at 568 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
89 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell concluded that any intrusion on
Mendenhall’s liberty and privacy interests was “quite modest.” Id. at 562–63 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Evaluating the severity (or value) of the
intrusion element, the Justices remarked:
The intrusion . . . was quite modest. Two plainclothes agents approached
[Mendenhall] as she walked through a public area. [Mendenhall] was near airline
employees from whom she could have sought aid had she been accosted by
strangers. The agents identified themselves and asked to see some identification. One
officer asked [Mendenhall] why her airline ticket and her driver’s license bore
different names. . . . [Mendenhall] was not physically restrained. The agents did not
display weapons. The questioning was brief. In these circumstances, [Mendenhall]
could not reasonably have felt frightened or isolated from assistance.
Id. at 562–63.
The circuit courts of appeal have relied on Mendenhall in holding citizens to very high
standards of “reasonableness.” For instance, in United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949 (6th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 819 (2007), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed a district court judge’s ruling, which had granted a defendant’s motion to
suppress as clearly erroneous and held that the defendant was not seized—even though an
officer lacking probable cause repeatedly asked the defendant to supply his name, social
security number, birth date, and to produce identification that the defendant said he did not
have—based on the circuit court’s conclusion that a reasonable person would not have felt
constrained from walking away.
90 See Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405–06 (2007) (explaining that the Court
adopted Justice Stewart’s “touchstone” in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991), but
later added that “when a person ‘has no desire to leave’ for reasons unrelated to the police
presence, the ‘coercive effect of the encounter’ can be measured better by asking whether ‘a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter’” (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991))).
91 127 S. Ct. at 2405–07. The Supreme Court’s decision was unanimous, but the courts
below were anything but. The trial court rejected the defendant/passenger’s claim that the traffic
stop constituted an unlawful seizure of his person. Id. at 2404. The California Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the passenger was seized. Id. In a close decision, the Supreme Court of
California reversed again, finding that a passenger is not seized during a typical traffic stop “‘in
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the same test of seizure that was first announced by Justice Stewart in
Mendenhall:92 “[W]hether a reasonable person in [the passenger’s]
position when the car stopped would have believed himself free to
‘terminate the encounter’ between the police and himself.”93 The
Court’s answer? “We think that in these circumstances any reasonable
passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising
control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without
police permission.”94 The Court in Brendlin reasoned:
An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts with
an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and a
sensible person would not expect a police officer to allow
people to come and go freely from the physical focal point of
an investigation into faulty behavior or wrongdoing. If the
likely wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will
reasonably feel subject to suspicion owing to close
association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad
driving, the passenger will expect to be subject to some
scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would be so
obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that
no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.95
Although in Brendlin the Court reached an opposite conclusion
about citizen reasonableness than did the Justices in Mendenhall, the
case reiterates the Court’s practice of making its own judgments
about the behaviors and beliefs of “reasonable” citizens. The Court’s
view of whether a citizen’s actions and thoughts are reasonable
determines when a person is “seized,” implicating the Fourth
Amendment.

the absence of additional circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she
was the subject of the . . . officer’s investigation . . . .’” Id. at 2404–05 (quoting People v.
Brendlin, 136 P.3d 845, 846 (Cal. 2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007)).
92 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.(a)(i).
93 Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2406 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436).
94 Id. at 2406–07. The Court in Brendlin also declared that passengers are reasonable in
believing that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people
move around freely. Id. at 2407 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (holding that
during a traffic stop, an officer is permitted to order a passenger out of a car for the officer’s
safety) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that an officer could order a
driver from a car in a traffic stop)). The announcement of reasonableness in Brendlin rested on
the Court’s assumption that officers would limit movement to protect officer safety. Id. at 2406.
95 Id. at 2407.
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(iii) Christopher Drayton, an unreasonable
commercial bus patron.
Although the Court concluded that a reasonable passenger in a
private car would feel constrained from leaving the scene of a traffic
stop without police permission, the Court has held that a passenger on
a Greyhound bus is not subject to such restrictions during a “bus
sweep.” In United States v. Drayton, the Court held that two
patrons were not seized and were, therefore, unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment, despite oppressive police behaviors that occurred
in the cramped confines of a Greyhound bus.96 Officers conducted a
“bus sweep,” looking for passengers who might be transporting drugs,
although they had no reason to suspect anyone on the bus of criminal
conduct.97 Three officers entered the bus. One knelt on the driver’s
seat to watch passengers;98 the second officer positioned himself at
the back of the bus, also to observe passengers;99 the third officer
walked slowly from the back of the bus forward, asking passengers
about their travel plans and luggage.100
When the third officer reached Christopher Drayton and his
traveling companion, Brown, the officer noticed that they “were
wearing heavy jackets and baggy pants despite the warm weather.”101
He leaned over Drayton’s shoulder, displayed his badge, said that he
was attempting to “deter” the transportation of illegal drugs and guns,
and asked to “check” their luggage.102 Drayton and Brown “agreed”
to a search of the bag. The search uncovered neither drugs nor
guns.103 Undeterred, the officer asked Brown if he could “check” his
person. When Brown “agreed,” the officer patted Brown’s upper
thighs and found drugs.104 The officer then arrested and handcuffed
Brown and removed Brown from the bus.105 Next, the officer asked
Drayton, “Mind if I check you?”106 When Drayton’s body language

96 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002). See also INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 212, 218–20 (1984) (assessing the reasonable behaviors and beliefs of factory workers
who were subject to police interrogation while confined by their work duties and holding that
such workers were not “seized”).
97 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 198.
100 Id. As he moved up the aisle of the bus, the third officer asked passengers to identify
their luggage stored in overhead racks. Id.
101
Id. at 199.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106
Id.
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suggested acquiescence, the officer searched Drayton and found drugs
taped to his thighs also.107
Before trial, both defendants moved to suppress the cocaine found
taped to their legs, arguing that the drugs were uncovered as a result
of an unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful seizure. When the
suppression issue reached the Supreme Court, it ruled, as a matter of
law, that neither Drayton nor Brown was “seized” when he consented
to the officer’s search of his luggage and body, and that the
defendants’ consent to these searches was completely voluntary.108
The Court reiterated that if a reasonable person would feel free to
terminate an encounter with police, then he or she is not seized.109
The Court resolved:
[W]e conclude that the police did not seize respondents when
they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. The
officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they
were required to answer the officers’ questions. When Officer
Lang approached respondents, he did not brandish a weapon
or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so
that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by
one and in a polite, quiet voice. Nothing he said would
suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was barred from
leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter.110
Thus, a majority of the Court summarily decided that a
“reasonable” passenger on a commercial bus feels unconstrained to
refuse an officer’s request to identify and open his luggage and
equally free to say “no” when the officer asks to “pat-down” his body
and clothing. In fact, a majority of the Court declared that a
reasonable bus passenger, under such circumstances, would feel
empowered to leave the bus.111
107 Id.

at 200. See discussion of consent, infra Part II.A.2.(c).
at 201. According to the Court, in a bus encounter the “Mendenhall” seizure test is
adapted—“[t]he proper inquiry ‘is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” Id. at 202 (quoting Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)).
110 Id. at 203–04. See also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), in which the Supreme
Court made a similar determination—that factory workers were not seized, implicating Fourth
Amendment rights, even though armed law enforcement agents positioned themselves at the
exits of a factory and other agents dispersed throughout the factory, questioning factory
employees at their work stations.
111 In an empirical study that evaluated the perceived intrusiveness of such bus sweeps, two
professors found strong dissonance between the Court’s view and the views of ordinary,
“reasonable” citizens. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 17, at 742. The professors noted that,
in Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that police efforts to detect drug
108 Id.
109 Id.
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In sum, the Court expressly and directly evaluates citizen
reasonableness when it determines whether a person is “seized”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the Court
has declared that a frightened twenty-two-year-old African-American
female confronted by two white DEA agents is not seized; that a man
wearing baggy pants, while traveling on a cramped Greyhound bus,
who is repeatedly questioned by one of three white, armed officers
“working” the bus is not seized; but that a passenger in a personal-use
car, which is subjected to a typical traffic stop, is seized.
(b) The Court decides when a search takes place.
Although the Court does not expressly talk about citizen
reasonableness when it decides whether police have conducted a
search, Fourth Amendment search issues turn on societal expectations
of privacy, which necessarily depend on the perspectives of ordinary
citizens. The Court applies a two-part test to decide if the government
has conducted a “search”: 1) “whether the individual, by his conduct,
has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,’”112 and
2) “whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”113 Often the
Court assumes that a citizen held an actual expectation of privacy and
evaluates only the second part of the test, treating the inquiry as a
question of law. Two cases—Oliver v. United States114 and Smith v.
Maryland115—illustrate the Court’s de novo evaluation of societal
expectations of privacy.
In Oliver, the Court considered whether a criminal defendant’s
subjective expectation of privacy—that his “highly secluded”
farmland, protected by no trespassing signs and a locked gate116—was
an expectation “‘that society [wa]s prepared to recognize as
“reasonable.”’”117 Without input from non-judicial members of

smuggling by singling out a passenger on a bus and asking to search his luggage either is not a
seizure, or is only a minimally intrusive one, because such a person should normally feel free to
“terminate the encounter.” Id. (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)). In contrast, results from
their empirical study revealed that citizens view such intrusions as very invasive—much more
invasive than being questioned on a public sidewalk for ten minutes. Id.
112 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967)).
113 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 740).
114 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
115 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
116 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–74 (describing that the field was “bounded on all sides by
woods, fences, and embankments and [could not] be seen from any point of public access”).
117 Id. at 177 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). Defendant Oliver
had been growing marijuana in the secluded fields. Id. at 173.
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society or other empirical data about society’s views regarding
the reasonable or unreasonable nature of Mr. Oliver’s privacy
expectations, the Court in Oliver concluded that, despite its secluded
nature, the farmland was “an open field.”118 Thus, according to the
Supreme Court, the government’s warrantless “search” of the field
was a “non-search,” deserving of no Fourth Amendment protection.119
Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
installation and use of a pen register at the office of the telephone
company, which recorded the phone numbers dialed by a specific
customer, does not constitute a search implicating Fourth Amendment
protections.120 In Smith, the Court explained that whether the use of
the pen register violates the Fourth Amendment turns on “whether the
person invoking [Fourth Amendment] protection can claim a
‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’
that has been invaded by government action.”121 The Court ultimately
decided that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. The
Court seemed to speculate: “[W]e doubt that people in general
entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they
dial.”122 The Court also made assumptions about what reasonable
people do and think:
All telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are
completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone
company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance
(toll) calls on their monthly bills.123
As the Oliver and Smith cases illustrate, the purported legal
standard for determining whether officers have conducted a search is
a mixed question of law and fact turning on how society perceives
such intrusions. Nevertheless, while the standard would seem to
require an assessment of how reasonable citizens perceive a situation,
at 177.
at 178, 181. See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left
outside the curtilage of a home because people who expose their garbage to the public “have . . .
no reasonable expectation of privacy” in the garbage).
120 442 U.S. at 740.
121 Id. (citing, inter alia, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
122 Id. at 742.
123 Id. But see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (holding that an overnight house
guest possesses legitimate expectations of privacy in host’s home); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 325 (1987) (“A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable.”).
118 Id.
119 Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1107277

8/20/2008 5:05:27 PM

26

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

the Court treats these mixed questions as if they are purely legal
issues and, therefore, subjects them to a de novo review, deciding for
itself whether police conducted a “search.”
(c) The Court decides whether a citizen consented to a search.
Although the Court does not necessarily describe such issues in
terms of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the Court often resolves
disputed issues of consent. These issues present themselves as mixed
issues that are dependent on whether the citizen voluntarily agreed or,
conversely, felt undue pressure.124 The Court determines the validity
of consent in cases in which law enforcement officers relied on the
consent of someone with authority to permit a search125 and in cases
in which an officer incorrectly, but “reasonably,” believed that
someone held that power.126
(i) Actual consent.
When someone voluntarily agrees to a search of his home, person,
or property, the Court deems the subsequent search “reasonable” for
Fourth Amendment purposes.127 The Court resolves these fact-laden
questions about the voluntariness of citizen consent by deciding
whether the citizen was pressured into agreeing. The Court treats
these fact-intensive, circumstance-specific mixed issues as if they
were pure legal questions.128 The Court reviews these issues de novo,
124 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating that it is “well settled”
that a search conducted with consent is an exception to the requirement of a warrant or probable
cause).
125 Id. at 221.
126 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 187–89 (1990).
127 Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires that law enforcement officers
obtain a warrant before entering a person’s home, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586
(1980) (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.”), law enforcement officers are excused from obtaining a warrant, if they obtain
the voluntary consent of the person whose home is searched. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 219.
The consent of someone with “common authority” over the premises also permits law
enforcement officers to enter and search without a warrant. See United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974). But see Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (finding a search of a
home unreasonable when conducted without a warrant and pursuant to the consent of one
co-occupant over the objection of a second and present co-occupant). In the similar context of
evaluating the voluntariness of a criminal defendant’s confession, the Court has expressly
labeled voluntariness a “legal question,” not one of fact. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110
(1985); id. at 118 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that “it is difficult to sensibly distinguish
the determination that a particular confession was voluntary” (that the majority says “is not an
issue of fact”) from “the determinations which [the Court] ha[s] held to be entitled to a
presumption of correctness under § 2254(d)”).
128 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002) (recounting many of the facts
of the case, including the “cooperative” nature of the interaction between Drayton and the
officer and the fact that there “‘was nothing coercive [or] confrontational’ about the encounter”
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even though consent turns on the perspectives and beliefs of
reasonable citizens and the circumstances of the person granting the
permission.129
(ii) Apparent consent.130
Not only does the Court determine whether a citizen’s consent was
voluntary, but it also evaluates searches resting on the “permission”
of someone who lacks the authority to agree to a search. In Illinois v.
Rodriguez, the Court deemed “reasonable” such a “consent” search of
a home.131 The Court held that officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment when they conduct a warrantless search of a home based
on the purported consent of a third person whom officers incorrectly,
but reasonably, believe exercises common authority to permit the
entry and search.132 According to the Court: “What [an American] is
assured by the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that no government
search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such
search will occur that is ‘unreasonable.’”133 Thus, according to the
Court, it is the officer’s reasonable impression of consent that matters,
not a resident or property owner’s reasonable behaviors or beliefs in
giving or denying consent to search her home that counts.134

(brackets in original) (citation omitted)). See also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111 (noting that Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in consent cases rests on “the great significance given to widely
shared social expectations”).
129 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 103.
130 Apparent consent cases are difficult to categorize as requiring an assessment of police
reasonableness or as involving an analysis of citizen reasonableness. Although a common-sense
interpretation of consent would lead to an inquiry into the actual and reasonable actions of the
citizen who authorized the search, the Court’s consent cases usually focus on the law
enforcement officers’ reasonable beliefs about whether someone consented (whether or not the
person had authority to consent). See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (“The
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?”); see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187–89
(discussing apparent consent, which hinges on the reasonable beliefs of law enforcement
officers).
131 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
132 Id. at 179, 186. In Rodriguez, the defendant was arrested in his apartment and charged
with unlawful possession of drugs. Id. at 179. The police entered the apartment with the
purported consent of Rodriguez’s former girlfriend, who had a key to the apartment but no right
to be there. Id. at 179–80. The girlfriend had moved from the apartment several weeks earlier.
Id. at 180–81. Her name was not on the lease; she did not pay rent; and she never had access to
the apartment when Rodriguez was not home. Id.
133 Id. at 183 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
134 Id. at 186, 189 (“[T]he Appellate Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
officers reasonably believed that [the third party/girlfriend] had the authority to consent, because
it ruled as a matter of law that a reasonable belief could not validate the entry. Since [the
Supreme Court] find[s] that ruling to be in error, [it] remands for consideration of that
question.”).
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Accordingly, appellate courts, including the Supreme Court,
decide these mixed questions of consent, despite the fact that consent
centers (or should) on the perspectives of ordinary citizens.
B. The Court Sometimes Re-assesses Facts.
In addition to deciding mixed questions of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness that rest on fact-intensive, circumstance-specific value
judgments, the Court occasionally re-assesses facts decided in the
courts below.
The Court has described facts as “‘basic, primary, or historical
facts: facts “in the sense of a recital of external events and the
credibility of their narrators.”’”135 Scholars have elaborated on the
Court’s description, explaining that fact questions are “case-specific
inquir[ies] into what happened here.”136 In addition to questions of
“pure” historical facts, the Court has sometimes said that when “an
issue involves an inquiry into state of mind [that inquiry] is not at all
inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact,”137 and the Court
has, in at least some contexts, declared that “[i]ssues involving
credibility are normally considered factual matters.”138
Historically, juries have decided questions of fact,139 and appellate
courts have accepted their factual findings, unless the findings are
clearly erroneous.140 But in Fourth Amendment matters, magistrate
judges and other trial-level judges, not juries, act as fact finders.141
Furthermore, although the usual standards of appellate review
theoretically apply to the trial-judges’ findings of fact,142 as
demonstrated below, the Court has, in practice, sometimes reviewed
135 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1995) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963)).
136 Monaghan, supra note 30, at 235 (1985) (citing other scholars).
137 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).
138 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1989); see also Miller, 474 U.S.
at 114 (“When, for example, the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns
largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for
leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court and according its determinations
presumptive weight.” (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985))).
139 See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 64, 66–67, 84–86 (1894); see also discussion
supra Part II., introduction.
140 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (declaring that reviewing courts
should review findings of historical fact “only for clear error”); see also Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991) (acknowledging that “pure issue[s] of fact [are] subject to
review under a deferential standard”).
141 See Luna, supra note 9, at 839 (proposing a thought experiment to ponder a change
from judge decision makers to jury decision makers in Fourth Amendment suppression matters).
142 See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 694–95 n.3 (“‘Clear error’ is a term of art . . . and applies
when reviewing questions of fact.”).
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the trial judge’s findings of fact anew. Because the Supreme Court
Justices are not present to see, hear, and receive factual evidence
first-hand, the Court’s decisions appear result-oriented when it rejects
the reasonable conclusions of other seemingly rational decision
makers who previously resolved the fact disputes with the benefit of
first-hand evidence. A recent case—Scott v. Harris143—demonstrates
this point.
In Scott, the Supreme Court evaluated the meaning of “reasonable
force.” Scott was a civil action144 in which the driver of a fleeing car
sued an officer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.145 The driver asserted
that the law enforcement officer had applied excessive force in
ramming the bumper of the driver’s car, causing the car to spin out of
control, and rendering the driver a quadriplegic.146 The driver had not
been suspected of a specific crime but caught an officer’s attention by
speeding.147
The officer moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was
entitled to qualified immunity from suit.148 The district court judge
denied the officer’s motion, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed that decision.149 Both the trial court and the court of
appeals concluded that the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct
was an issue for a jury.150 Despite both lower-court rulings, the
Supreme Court conducted its own analysis of the Fourth Amendment
reasonable-force issue, re-assessed the “substantial and immediate
risk” of physical injury to persons other than the driver, and
determined that the law enforcement officer had acted reasonably,
fulfilling his Fourth Amendment obligations, even though the officer
exposed the driver to significant physical injury (or even death) by
ramming the car.151
The outcome of the Scott case is unassailable. No one could
persuasively dispute that (at least) sometimes a police officer acts
reasonably even if he rams the bumper of a fleeing suspect’s car to
stop the suspect’s escape.152 But, should the Court have conducted its
143 127

S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
fact that Scott is a civil action is insignificant for purposes of this analysis because
the standards of Fourth Amendment reasonableness are the same in actions pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) and in criminal suppression matters.
145 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1772.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1779.
152 Imagine if an officer bumps the car of an extremely dangerous, fleeing suspect and
intentionally forces his car into a large field enclosed by a fence that neither the suspect nor the
144 The
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own assessment of reasonableness in direct contradiction of the four
lower-court judges?
In deciding that the officer acted reasonably and complied with his
Fourth Amendment obligations, eight members of the Supreme Court
relied on its typical balancing formula, weighing the nature and
quality of the driver’s Fourth Amendment interests and comparing
that value to the need the Court perceived for the government’s
intrusion on the driver’s rights.153 In assigning values, the Court said
that it considered “the risk of bodily harm that [the officer]’s actions
posed to [the driver] in light of the threat to the public that [the
officer] was trying to eliminate.”154 As part of its evaluation of the
threat to the public, the Court took into account “not only the number
of lives at risk, but also [the driver’s and officer’s] relative
culpability.”155 In other words, the Court156 made findings about the
nature of the driver’s conduct and his culpability, assessed the risks
and benefits of his conduct in light of his perceived culpability, and
made similar assessments about the law enforcement officer’s actions
and the need and desire for the police conduct.
Even though the Court made these findings about the specific facts
of the case and assigned values to the opposing interests correlated
with these facts, the Court expressly labeled its inquiry into
reasonableness to be a “pure question of law.”157 In dissent, Justice
Stevens contended: “Here, the Court has usurped the jury’s
factfinding function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the four other
judges to review the case unreasonable.”158 Notably, Justice Scalia,

car could escape. Also assume that the contact does not endanger bystanders or animals and
causes no permanent property damage. Few would rationally declare the officer’s conduct
“unreasonable” under that scenario. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4 (1985) (holding that
officers may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected
felon unless the officers have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officers or others).
153 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778 (explaining how the Court “‘must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion’” (quoting United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983))).
154 Id.
155 Id. The Court also remarked: “It was [the driver], after all, who intentionally placed
himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that
ultimately produced the choice between two evils that [the officer] confronted.” Id.
156 Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at 1781–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 1776 n.8 (majority opinion). In his dissent, Justice Stevens complained that the
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct should have been decided by the jury. Id. at 1784
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level warranting deadly
force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury.”); id. at 1781 (“[T]he question of the
reasonableness of the officer’s actions should be decided by a jury . . . .”).
158 Id. at 1784.
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who wrote for the majority, couched the Scott decision in language
suggesting that the outcome turned on the case’s procedural posture.
In this regard, Justice Scalia quipped: “Respondent’s version of
events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury
could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied
on such visible fiction.”159
If the majority actually evaluated the reasonableness issue
exclusively to determine whether or not it survived the summary
judgment standard, then the Court’s method and conclusion were
sound. After all, it is now well-established that a court has the
authority to issue judgment in favor of a party as a matter of law, if
the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail” and no
reasonable jury could decide otherwise.160
But a careful review of the majority’s decision in Scott suggests
that the Supreme Court went further and engaged in affirmative fact
finding and inference drawing, including assessing the culpability of
the chasing officer and the fleeing driver.161 After watching
videotapes from the record compiled in the trial court, the Justices
commented on the quality of the plaintiff’s driving and the number of
other motorists the driver put at risk during his flight from the
pursuing officer.162 Only after watching the tapes and rejecting the
lower courts’ interpretation of the driver’s conduct depicted in them,
did the Court reverse the decision of the district court judge, who had
viewed the same tapes.163 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
declared: “The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the
story told by [the fleeing motorist] and adopted by the Court of
Appeals.”164 In other words, the Court made its own credibility
judgments.
Despite the majority’s characterization of the decision as one
mandated by the summary judgment standard, it is difficult to square
such a conclusion with the Court’s unconventional act of reviewing
the tapes and then rejecting the observations and inferences drawn
from them by the four lower-court judges—all of whom concluded
at 1776 (majority opinion).
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986) (holding that summary
judgment decisions turn on “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law”).
161
This author is not the only one to reach this conclusion. See David K. Kessler,
Comment, Justices in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 424, 434 (arguing that the Court in Scott “encroached on the
jury’s role” and that Scott “represents an improper invasion of judges into the jury box”).
162 See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
163 See id. at 1784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 1775 (majority opinion).
159 Id.

160 Anderson
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that there was balanced evidence sufficient to allow a jury to decide
the reasonable or unreasonable nature of the officer’s (and arguably
the driver’s) conduct.165
The Court’s handling of the Scott case demonstrates a significant
flaw in the Court’s process of judging reasonableness that lends fuel
to those who criticize the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
describing it as “perverse,” “a jumble,” “contradictory,” “a mystery,”
and “a fiction . . . for attaining the desired legal consequence.”166
Given the clear and well-established rule of deference to fact-finders’
determinations, when the Court assesses or re-assesses facts on its
way to deciding whether a search or seizure was reasonable, the
Court’s decisions appear result-oriented.167
C. The Court’s Process of Judging Reasonableness Results in
Unreasonable Fourth Amendment Outcomes.
1. The pitfalls of deciding all mixed issues.
Juries normally decide “reasonableness.” For instance, juries
determine whether someone acted negligently, which requires them
to decide whether a person behaved reasonably given the
circumstances.168 Jurors award “reasonable” damages,169 decide
165 Interestingly, three professors recently conducted a study in which 1,350 Americans
viewed the same video the judges saw in Scott. Although a majority of the viewers agreed with
the Supreme Court’s ultimate conclusions, “there were sharp differences of opinion along
cultural, ideological, and other lines.” Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman,
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism,
122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1081227).
166 See sources cited supra note 9 and the accompanying quotations of a few of the many
criticisms of the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions.
167 The Scott decision is not unique. The Court has rejected fact-finders’ Fourth
Amendment conclusions before, even the conclusions reached by a citizen jury. See, e.g.,
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 n.1 (2005) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
697–99 (1996)) (vacating a jury verdict declaring that the Fourth Amendment was violated
when officers detained a home’s occupant for an extended period in handcuffs while officers
conducted a search of the premises).
168 For a discussion of negligence as a fact question, see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that negligence is a “traditional jury
question”); Flannelly v. Del. & Hudson Co., 225 U.S. 597, 603 (1912) (stating that defense of
contributory negligence is a fact question for a jury); Davidson S.S. Co. v. United States, 205
U.S. 187, 190 (1907) (finding that whether injury is a result of negligence and which party is
responsible for the negligence, are questions of fact properly determined by a jury). For a
discussion of the intersection of negligence with reasonable care, see Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry.,
319 U.S. 350, 352 (1943) (finding that an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in
which the Supreme Court found “sufficient evidence” should “go to the jury on the question
whether . . . respondent was negligent in failing to use reasonable care in furnishing [an
employee] with a safe place to work”); Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 609 (1891) (“[T]he
omission of the reasonable care required is the negligence which creates the liability; and
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contract issues that hinge on “reasonableness,”170 and regularly
evaluate the reasonableness of a criminal defendant’s behavior and
beliefs to determine the defendant’s substantive guilt or innocence.171
Juries are asked to decide whether a criminal defendant’s claim of
provocation is reasonable172 and whether a defendant was reasonable
in believing that he was subject to an imminent threat, justifying an
act of self-defense.173

whether this existed is a question of fact for the jury to determine . . . .”); see also Nat’l
Hispanic Circus, Inc. v. Rex Trucking, Inc., 414 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that the
question of whether injuries “were reasonably foreseeable . . . at the time of contracting” was a
proper question for the jury to decide).
169 See Konvitz v. Midland Walwyn Capital, Inc., 129 Fed. App’x 344, 347 (9th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished) (describing a jury finding that a quantum meruit damages award was reasonable
compensation for fraudulent breach of contract).
170 See United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 745 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (upholding a jury finding that an employee “‘reasonably relied on the provisions of the
employee handbook to his detriment’” (quoting United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ.,
946 F. Supp. 31, 36 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, United States ex rel. Yesudian v.
Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).
171 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (resting determinations of criminal guilt with the jury);
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979) (“To uphold a conviction on a charge that was
neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most basic notions of
due process.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“‘No man should be deprived of his
life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say
that the evidence . . . is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged.’” (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484,
493 (1895))); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220–21 (1862) (indicating that the issue of
whether a criminal defendant acted in response to “reasonable” or “adequate” provocation to
mitigate murder to manslaughter is a question for a jury); see also COMM. ON PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, SIXTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, § 6.05(2)(A) (2005) (instructing the jury on the defense of coercion, including
telling the jury that to benefit from the defense, the defendant must have “reasonably” believed
there was an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to himself or another); id. § 6.06
(2) (instructing that self-defense requires a jury to find that the defendant used only force that
“reasonably” appeared necessary under the circumstances); JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 270 (4th ed. 2007) (“The ‘reasonable man’ (or, sometimes,
‘ordinary man’) shows up throughout the criminal law and represents an objective standard by
which the defendant’s conduct is measured [by the jury].”); Bacigal, Putting the People Back,
supra note 11, at 381 (asserting that juries typically resolve mixed issues in criminal cases when
asked to decide “concepts like insanity, adequate provocation, self-defense, criminal negligence,
or some more general aspect of the reasonable prudent person concept.”).
Arguably, when the Court finds facts and evaluates certain mixed questions of law and fact
that juries are equally or better equipped to find and make, the Court infringes on a criminal
defendant’s due process rights because, in the criminal law context, fact-finding functions are
more appropriately assigned to a jury than a judge. But this last argument is beyond the scope of
this Article, which seeks to identify the cause for the Court’s unreasonable Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and to propose a modest solution to improve the Court’s process.
172 See, e.g., Maher, 10 Mich. at 220–21.
173 See, e.g., Zachary v. State, 888 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ind. App. 2008) (“A self-defense
claim can prevail in a homicide prosecution only if the defendant had a reasonable fear of death
or great bodily harm. The jury looks from a defendant’s viewpoint when considering facts
relevant to self-defense.” (citation omitted)).
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Thus, the Court usurps the typical role of the fact finder, including
juries, when it decides reasonableness as if reasonableness were a
purely legal question. The Court’s current judge-only approach to
Fourth Amendment cases conflicts with the jury’s historic importance
in search and seizure matters and in criminal cases in general. As
Professor Ronald J. Bacigal has demonstrated in an article exploring
the historic significance of the jury to Fourth Amendment concepts,
“Colonial Americans were active participants in the tribunals that
addressed early search and seizure law.”174 And even the modern
Supreme Court, which allows juries virtually no input in Fourth
Amendment matters, has expressly acknowledged the constitutional
stature of juries in criminal cases. The Court has recognized “that trial
by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice”175 and that the proper workings of a jury protect the people
against “arbitrary rule.”176 In fact, the Court has broadly declared:
“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government.”177 Furthermore, as the more recent decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey (and its progeny) establishes, the jury plays a
constitutionally-mandated role even in the sentencing phase of
criminal matters.178 Despite the undeniable importance of juries in
criminal cases, the Supreme Court maintains a monopoly over issues
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Moreover, when the Court weighs law enforcement needs against
citizen interests to decide Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the
Court relies on an inherently subjective process, though
reasonableness purports to be an objective standard.179 Because the
174

Bacigal, Putting the People Back, supra note 11, at 360.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
176
Id. at 151. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (acknowledging
America’s tradition of using juries “as instruments of public justice” and that juries support our
country’s “basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government” (quoting
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
177
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965); SIR
PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956)).
178
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact, “[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, . . . that increases the penalty for a crime” must be proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
179 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (asserting that the objective test
for seizure, which looks “to the reasonable man’s interpretation of conduct,” guides the police
by “allow[ing them] to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate
the Fourth Amendment” and “ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not
vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached”). See also United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (purporting to judge citizen beliefs by an
175
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reasonableness standard is subjective, when the Court has weighed
competing interests to decide reasonableness, it has often been unable
to reach quantifiably rational outcomes.180 The Court, too, has
recognized that “translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task.”181 The Court has
occasionally even expressly admitted the imprecision that results
when it assesses reasonableness. “The test [for determining whether a
person is seized] is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to
assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather
than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation.”182
Thus, while the Court’s balancing process might appear logical,
rational, and objective upon a cursory review, a closer analysis
reveals the vast leeway inherent in its process of assigning values to
liberty and privacy, on the one hand, and the need for law
enforcement’s intrusion on those rights, on the other.183
Furthermore, when the Court decides issues of citizen
reasonableness, the Court often sets a benchmark for citizen and
suspect behaviors according to a hypothetical reasonable person
standard that is extremely demanding.184 As numerous critics have

“objective,” innocent-person measure); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)
(hinging a Fourth Amendment “seizure” on the beliefs of a “reasonable person” in view of “all
of the circumstances surrounding the incident”).
180 See Nadler, supra note 9, at 154 (noting the “ever-widening gap between Fourth
Amendment consent jurisprudence, on the one hand, and scientific findings about the
psychology of compliance and consent, on the other”); id. at 166 (asserting that the Court relies
on “the Justices’ own imagined thoughts and feelings of a reasonable person”); id. at 165
(“[Justices] are trying to answer a question with a crucial empirical component using only
intuitive reflections on their own experience and about the imagined experience of other
citizens.”).
181 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). The Court has also said that: 1) “the
concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
274 (2002) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)); 2) “reasonable suspicion
is not a ‘finely-tuned standar[d],’” id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696) (brackets in original);
and 3) the requisite “cause ‘sufficient to authorize police to stop a person’ is an ‘elusive
concept,’” id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
182 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573.
183 See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision finding a lack of
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop and correspondingly rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s attempt
to delineate individual factors in the case that influenced a finding of reasonable suspicion). As
Professor Nadler has suggested, “the Court’s Fourth Amendment . . . jurisprudence is either
based on serious errors about human behavior and judgment, or else has devolved into a fiction
of the crudest sort—a mere device for attaining the desired legal consequence.” Nadler, supra
note 9, at 156.
184 See Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters,” supra note 76, at 248 (criticizing the Court
for “construct[ing] Fourth Amendment principles assuming that there is an average,
hypothetical person who interacts with the police officers” and describing this notion as “naive”
and contrary to “the real world that police officers and black men live in”).
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asserted, in some contexts the Court’s measure of reasonable citizen
behavior is too tough for real people to meet.185 And the Court
decides these citizen reasonableness issues based on nothing more
than its own intuition about how reasonable bus passengers, travelers,
and others think and behave in a hypothetical situation. There is no
empirical or other evidentiary support for the Court’s stiff standards.
In sum, the Court’s case outcomes in cases involving mixed issues
of reasonableness are inconsistent,186 seemingly result-oriented, and
they often defy common-sense notions of how reasonable citizens
respond to police demands.
2. The pitfalls of assessing (and re-assessing) facts.
When the Supreme Court steps beyond its law-declaring expertise
and re-assesses facts decided below, it reaches conclusions that
appear result-oriented. Sometimes, like in Scott, the Court’s case
outcomes contradict the findings of other, seemingly reasonable
decision makers in the courts below. When the Court substitutes its
judgment for that of another decision maker who was in a better
position to see, hear, and evaluate the persuasiveness of the witnesses
and other evidence, the Court’s decisions look contrived. Because
fact-finding trial judges and jurors see and hear witnesses, they can
evaluate demeanor and credibility first-hand.187 Credibility cannot be
185 See Nadler, supra note 9 (criticizing the Court’s consent jurisprudence and the manner
in which it determines what a reasonable person in the position of the searchee would think or
believe); Simmons, supra note 9, at 747 (criticizing the Court’s consent jurisprudence, as “at
once absurd, meaningless, and irrelevant”); see also Butterfoss, supra note 19, at 439 (arguing
that the Court relies on a “legal fiction” when evaluating whether a reasonable person would
feel free to end an encounter with police and walk away, and urging that such citizens rarely feel
such freedom).
186 Notice that in Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007), which involved a
passenger riding in a car, the usual type of transportation for an upper-middle-class white male,
the Court unanimously agreed that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave the scene of
a traffic stop. But in the cramped confines of a Greyhound bus on which you would find very
few, if any, upper-middle-class white men, the Court decided that a reasonable bus passenger
would feel free to leave the bus even while officers with badges and guns methodically
interrogated other bus passengers. United States v.Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
187 When juries decide issues, they “typically try to construct a narrative that satisfactorily
accounts for all of the credible evidence they have seen and heard.” Todd E. Pettys, The
Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1629 (2007) (citing Reid Hastie, Emotions in
Jurors’ Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 994 (2001)). “In constructing those narratives,
[jurors] draw heavily from their own past experiences.” Id. at 1629–30 (citing Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making, 49 COGNITION
123, 126 (1993)). Because juries are made up of people with sometimes markedly different
experiences, they have the benefit of different perspectives and inferences from the same bits of
evidence. Id. at 1630. See also Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision
Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006) (suggesting that a diverse jury deliberates in a more
thorough and valuable way). In short, jurors make decisions by relying on their own experiences
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determined on a cold, written record. And witnesses, including
law-enforcement-witnesses, sometimes lie.188 As the Court has
acknowledged in other contexts: “When . . . the issue involves the
credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of
demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving
the process of applying law to fact to the trial court [or jury] and
according its determinations presumptive weight.”189
Fact finders also benefit from an understanding of the local
customs.190 They know the community, including the peculiarities of
the geography, the prejudices, the conflicts among relevant groups,
and the like.191 Appellate judges sitting far removed from the
witnesses, evidence, topography, and societal happenings, cannot
replicate these experiences and are, therefore, at a disadvantage to

and by “focus[ing] their attention on those narratives that their experience-based common sense
leads them to regard as plausible.” Pettys, supra, at 1631; see also id. at 1628 (arguing that
“demeanor” serves “as a reasonably reliable basis for determining whether a speaker is
deceptive” and that observers can successfully detect lies by listening for an increase “in the
pitch of one’s tone of voice, increased hesitancy in one’s speech, and an increase in the number
of grammatical and other speech errors”); Bella M. DePaulo et al., Deceiving and Detecting
Deceit, in THE SELF AND SOCIAL LIFE 323, 339 (Barry R. Schlenker ed., 1985) (“Liars
blink their eyes more often, they have pupils that are more dilated, and they exhibit more
adaptors (self-manipulating gestures, such as rubbing or scratching). They also give shorter,
higher-pitched, and more hesitant answers that are cluttered with grammatical errors,
repetitions, slips of the tongue, and other disfluencies.”).
188 See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, but Few
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES May 12, 2008, at B1 (detailing several instances in which trial-level
judges determined that officers were lying about the happenings in a criminal case); see also
Assoc. Press, Jury Convicts Officer of Lying in Fatal Raid, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2008, at A21
(reporting that an Atlanta jury convicted a police officer of lying to investigators after a
“botched drug raid that resulted in the death of a 92-year-old woman”).
189 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
190 An empirical study by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel in the 1960s suggests that trial
judges and juries (both of whom are present at trial and see and hear the witnesses and evidence)
agree on approximately seventy-eight percent of criminal verdicts. NEIL J. KRESSEL & DORIT F.
KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY 101 (2002) (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL et. al.,
THE AMERICAN JURY 58 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1971)). The study also revealed that in the
cases in which the judge and jury disagreed on a verdict, in nineteen percent of these cases, the
jury voted to acquit while the judge would have convicted. Id. at 102. In other words, whether a
local judge or a local jury decides a criminal case, in the vast majority of instances, they will
agree. But the jury has one strong advantage over a judge—juries are viewed as playing an
important role in preventing “oppression by the government.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155 (1968); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (describing the jury’s
role as guarding against the exercise of arbitrary power of prosecutors and judges and providing
a common-sense judgment of the community). Furthermore, when juries are allowed to decide
important issues, citizens feel more part of the democratic process. See Mazzone, supra note 24,
at 39 (indicating that juries “legitimize outcomes” because the public is more respectful of
decisions reached by other ordinary citizens).
191
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 n.7 (1975) (citing legislative history of the
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 as demonstrating that “the jury is designed not
only to understand the case, but also to reflect the community’s sense of justice in deciding it”
(quoting H. R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 8 (1968))).
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decide factual issues accurately and fairly. Thus, when the Justices
substitute their value judgments about what happened in Fourth
Amendment cases for other, better-positioned decision makers, their
findings appear outcome-oriented.
D. The Court’s Strength Is in Declaring Rules of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness.
In contrast to the problematic decisions the Court reaches when
it analyzes Fourth Amendment issues that require an evaluation
of competing facts or fact-laden, circumstance-specific scenarios
involving ordinary citizens, the Court has reached rational,
legally-supportable
decisions
about
Fourth
Amendment
reasonableness when it has exercised its unique legal expertise to
declare broad legal principles to guide all law enforcement officers
and citizens.
When the Court announces bright-line, policy-based or
precedent-required rules to guide a myriad of police conduct, it
operates with maximum proficiency, highlighting the capability of
appellate judges to establish what the law is and the floor protections
afforded by the Constitution. For instance, the Court suitably stated a
broad rule of law in Terry v. Ohio,192 when it announced that it is
reasonable for an officer to seize a person and subject him to a limited
search for weapons on less than probable cause, if the officer has
reason to believe that she is dealing with an armed and dangerous
person.193 Similarly, the Court acted appropriately in Payton v. New
York,194 declaring “a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.”195 And the Court capitalized on its
expertise in Oliver v. United States, when it held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect “open fields.”196 Even in highly
controversial cases197—such as Thornton v. United States198 and New
192

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
at 27.
194 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
195 Id. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–475 (1971)).
196 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
197
See, e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s
Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment
Search and Seizure Law, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 77, 89 (2007) (asserting that after Thornton,
commentators “decried the expansion of the Belton bright-line rule as unwarranted and illadvised”).
198
541 U.S. 615 (2004). In Thornton, the Supreme Court extended a bright-line rule
previously established in Belton, permitting police to search the passenger compartment of a
recently-occupied car even when police first make contact with a suspect after he has left his car
and walked away from it. Id. at 622–24.
193 Id.
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York v. Belton,199 in which the Court declared bright-line rules
effectively reducing the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to
citizens by establishing rules supportive of police searches on less
than probable cause—the Court acts consistently with its expertise
and strengths when it declares what the legal rules of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure are. Moreover, the declaration of
broad, clear rules avoids the appearance that the Court is straining the
facts of a case or faulting a citizen for behaving normally.
In sum, when the Court issues decisions establishing clear rules
defining the threshold requirements of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, it provides the type of guidance that the Court has
described as important for law enforcement officers in the field who
must make split-second decisions about how to investigate crime
without infringing upon Fourth Amendment rights.200 But when it
goes further—for example, second-guessing conclusions of fact
finders and evaluating the reasonable beliefs of ordinary citizens—the
Court reaches problematic results.
III. A PROPOSAL TO RETURN REASONABLENESS TO THE COURT’S
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE.
The Court will produce more credible decisions that provide
unambiguous guidance for law enforcement officers, while
simultaneously declaring what protections the Fourth Amendment
does and does not give “the people,” if the Court confines itself to
deciding purely legal issues of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
and to evaluating only those “mixed” questions that require value
judgments about how reasonable officers behave, given law
enforcement policies, procedures, and typical investigation expertise.
These are the issues the Court is qualified to evaluate.
The Court should never re-assess facts, especially credibility
findings. Moreover, the Court should permit juries to assess
mixed issues, which require a value judgment that will benefit
from knowledge of local customs, community characteristics, and
199
453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981). In Belton, the Supreme Court declared a clear rule—that
it was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to conduct a search of the
passenger compartment of a car incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of the car. Id.
200 See id. at 181 (indicating the need for concrete rules because officers should not “have
to guess before every search”); see also Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623 n.3 (expressing
dissatisfaction with a rule that would force police officers to make “unworkable and factspecific inquir[ies]” before searching the passenger compartment of a recent occupant’s car);
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (“In short, ‘[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’” (quoting Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979))).
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an understanding of how ordinary citizens respond to police
questioning and police pressures. Accordingly, while issues of police
reasonableness may rationally remain the purview of the appellate
courts, juries of reasonable citizens are better-equipped to evaluate
issues of citizen reasonableness and should be invited to make these
value judgments.
To facilitate this more practical and realistic division of labor
between fact finders (including juries) and appellate judges, the
Supreme Court should recognize clear, rational, and predictable
distinctions separating categories of Fourth Amendment issues.201 If
the Court properly allocates decision-making responsibilities between
judges and juries in ways that maximize “the sound administration of
justice,”202 the Court will make strides toward returning
reasonableness to its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
To foster the Court’s fair and rational line drawing, this Article
urges the Court to expressly recognize three major categories of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness: 1) Legal Reasonableness; 2)
Factual Reasonableness; and 3) Mixed Reasonableness. All issues
that fall within the category of Legal Reasonableness should continue
to receive de novo review from appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court. Issues assigned to the Factual Reasonableness
category should be reviewed on appeal only for clear error; thus,
juries or fact-finding judges (not appellate judges) will determine
these issues. Finally, the Mixed Reasonableness category will
encompass Fourth Amendment issues that require further assessment.
Issues of Mixed Reasonableness will be further subdivided,
depending on whether appellate judges, trial judges, or juries are
best-suited to fairly and accurately decide the questions.
A. Legal Reasonableness.
The Legal Reasonableness category will include Fourth
Amendment issues that call for the Court to announce “rules and
standards of general application.”203 As discussed in Part II.D., issues
that fall within Legal Reasonableness can be found in Terry v. Ohio
201 In the Fourth Amendment context, an intellectually compelling argument could be
made for allowing juries to decide all Fourth Amendment issues, even issues declaring rules of
law. See Bacigal, A Case for Jury, supra note 11, at 824–25. But, even more convincing than the
argument for allowing juries to decide all Fourth Amendment issues is the need to allow juries
and trial-level judges to decide Fourth Amendment facts and some mixed issues of fact and law,
dividing duties in a way that reflects the respective strengths and weaknesses of those entities,
so that case outcomes begin to reflect the ideals represented in, and demanded by, the Fourth
Amendment.
202 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) and discussion supra Part II., pp. 9–12.
203 See Bross, supra note 12, at 874–75 (explaining the meaning of the word ‘law’).
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and New York v. Belton, in which the Court considered, respectively:
Whether an officer is ever authorized to conduct a
pat-down search for weapons on less than probable cause?; and
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to search the
passenger compartment of a car in which an arrestee was recently
sitting, if the occupant is lawfully arrested and the search is conducted
incident to that arrest? There will be no change in the way the Court
handles issues of Legal Reasonableness because the Court already
reviews issues of pure law using a de novo standard.
B. Factual Reasonableness.
The category for Factual Reasonableness will encompass Fourth
Amendment issues requiring the judge or jury to decide what
happened and whom to believe.204 Thus, for instance, a case turning
on whether the defendant agreed or disagreed with an officer’s
request to search the defendant’s person, car, or home, implicates
purely factual issues of reasonableness, falling squarely within
Factual Reasonableness.
In theory, the Court’s treatment of issues within the Factual
Reasonableness category should not change because, in numerous
contexts, the Court has acknowledged that issues of pure, historic fact
are for a jury (or other fact finder), and that courts should review such
findings with great deference to the decisions of those who observed
the demeanor of the witnesses, heard the live testimony, and
personally received and reviewed the evidence in the first instance.205
Nevertheless, the Court has sometimes resisted deference to fact
finders in Fourth Amendment cases. The Scott case, discussed
previously, is one example. There, a majority of the Court incorrectly
branded an inquiry into whether law enforcement officers acted
reasonably when applying deadly force to a suspect as “a pure
question of law.”206 The Court’s characterization of the nature of
the inquiry was patently incorrect. Determining whether a law
enforcement officer justifiably used deadly force on a suspect
necessarily requires someone to find facts—what actions the suspect
took; what actions (or inactions) the officer took; what the suspect did
in response; the attendant circumstances (was it dark or mid-day, was
discussion supra Part II., pp. 9–11.
e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990) (“Familiar with
the issues and litigants, the district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshal
the pertinent facts . . . .”); Miller, 474 U.S. at 111 (“[T]hat an issue involves an inquiry into state
of mind is not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact.”).
206 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 n.8 (2007); see also discussion of Scott supra
Part II. B.
204 See

205 See,
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the suspect known to the officer, had the suspect taken hostages, did
the suspect have a long, known criminal history, indicating his
dangerousness)—and then apply those facts to a general principle of
law—that an officer may or may not use a gun; shoot a suspect in the
back; shoot an unarmed suspect; ram a car at high speed; or take
similar actions.
The solution for reasonableness proposed here requires the Court
to strictly adhere to a fact/law dichotomy in which it exercises
restraint and guards against treating issues of fact, which impact an
analysis of reasonableness, as if they were questions of law.
Correspondingly, Factual Reasonableness requires the Court to
restrict its assessment of facts to a clear-error review. The Court’s
express acknowledgement of a distinction between Factual
Reasonableness and Legal Reasonableness will lend credibility to all
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions by reducing the
appearance that the Court is re-assessing facts to skew case outcomes.
C. Mixed Reasonableness.
The big change in the way the Court evaluates Fourth Amendment
issues will occur in this category. The Mixed Reasonableness
category holds the key to renewed reasonableness in the Court’s
Fourth Amendment cases because it is in dealing with these types of
questions that the Court has rendered faulty and common-sensedefying results. Applying the proposed change in procedure, the
Court will separate these issues. Dividing issues, however, is just the
beginning. Even after the Court correctly acknowledges an issue as
“mixed,” the Court will be left with considerable work to analyze
whether judges or jurors are better-suited to decide whole categories
of these hybrid, fact/law questions.
Until now, the Court has treated all Fourth Amendment
mixed issues the same, reviewing them de novo and assessing
reasonableness according to the Court’s own, subjective balancing
approach. But all mixed issues are not alike. As it has done in other
contexts, the Court should subdivide these issues into groups that
reflect which “judicial actor is better positioned . . . to decide [the
whole category] in question.”207 Once the Court categorizes mixed
issues in a logical and systematic way, it can reliably apply an
appropriate level of judicial review to each subgroup.
To enhance the proper administration of justice, the Supreme
Court should recognize at least two distinct subsets of mixed
207 See

Miller, 474 U.S. at 113–14; Monaghan, supra note 30, at 237.
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questions: 1) a “government subset,” and 2) a “citizen subset.”208 The
government subset should encompass mixed issues that warrant
a broad rule to guide law enforcement officers, who must make
split-second decisions in the field, and will include other issues
strongly tied to law enforcement policies and procedures. Issues in the
government subset can sensibly be decided by trial-level judges in the
first instance, as they are now, and most will continue to be reviewed
de novo by the United States Supreme Court.
In contrast to the way the government subset will be handled,
juries should decide all issues properly assigned to the citizen subset
of Mixed Reasonableness.209 Correspondingly, the juries’ conclusions
should receive strong deference on appeal. The citizen subset should
include mixed issues that are heavily dependent on the actions,
beliefs, and perspectives of typical, prudent, non-government citizens;
those that significantly benefit from an understanding of local
communities and customs; those hinging on credibility and witness
demeanor; and those that turn on how normal, prudent people respond
to fact-specific interactions with the police.
1. The “Government Subset.”
(a) The government subset includes assessments of the
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct.
Although the Court confronts numerous mixed questions when it
decides Fourth Amendment issues, the vast majority of Fourth
Amendment cases that reach the Supreme Court require an
assessment of police reasonableness.210 This subcategory of mixed
issues generally requires the Court to draw inferences and make
generalizations about the thoughts and acts of experienced police
officers. Because the reasonableness of an officer’s conclusions
208 There is no reason to believe that the Court could not draw even finer distinctions
among mixed questions than this Article proposes, but two subsets are an absolute necessity to
adequately reflect the different types of mixed Fourth Amendment issues the Court routinely
confronts.
209 See Recent Case, United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2007), 121
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1669 (2008) [hereinafter Recent Case] (“Although the choice of viewpoint
is often left out of the [Fourth Amendment] story, much also depends on whose perspective—
police officers’ or civilians’—a judge employs for search and seizure determinations.”).
210 For instance, whether an officer acts reasonably in entering a home without a warrant or
with a warrant, despite the fact that suspects moved out several weeks before, rests on the
reasonableness of the officer’s actions and her processing of available information. See Los
Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1990 (2007); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
400 (2006); see also Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006) (finding that an officer acted
reasonably when he conducted a suspicionless search of a parolee on a public street).
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necessarily rests on the credibility of the searching/seizing officer and
routinely requires someone to draw inferences inextricably
intertwined with such credibility findings—all tasks that juries are
equipped to (and often do) perform in other contexts—juries could
logically be asked to decide these questions.
But this subcategory of issues is more appropriately assigned to
trial judges. Judges tend to have more exposure to, and experience
with, law enforcement officers and law enforcement issues. For
decades federal magistrate judges have evaluated warrants and
conducted preliminary hearings; district court judges have reviewed
petitions for wire taps; and both types of these judges have regularly
observed dozens of agents who testify during trials and hearings. By
their mere repeated exposure to issues relating to law enforcement
policies, procedures, and habits, trial judges are arguably in a superior
position to determine how well-trained and prudent law enforcement
officers think and act during criminal investigations. Moreover, there
is uniformity in the way officers are trained to behave. Officers
undergo similar firearms training and schooling on arrest and
interrogation techniques, and they are taught how to acquire and
collect evidence, how to execute warrants, and similar skills. This
uniformity in training and education makes it more realistic that
judges will be able to apply an “objective” and generally uniform
standard of police conduct when judges determine whether an officer
acted “reasonably” given specific facts. Furthermore, because officers
should not be required to guess about whether their conduct is
constitutional, issues of police reasonableness call for broad,
policy-based declarations about how objectively-reasonable officers
should behave. The need for uniformity of precedents to guide law
enforcement officers, who must execute the laws without violating
the constitution, is strongest in these cases. Finally, there is no reason
to think that citizen juries are better equipped than judges to evaluate
reasonable police conduct.
Thus, mixed issues of police reasonableness—which necessarily
turn on law enforcement training, procedures, and policies—and
those issues requiring an announcement about how all prudent and
competent officers should act, are best decided by fact-finding judges,
not juries, even under the newly-proposed procedure. Accordingly,
trial judges, not juries, should continue to evaluate cases like Los
Angeles County v. Rettele, discussed in Part II.A.1, that declare
policy-based rules for when and how an officer may execute a search
warrant. They should evaluate cases like Brigham City v. Stuart,
discussed in Part II.A.1, in which the Court is asked to declare a
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general rule governing when officers can enter a home without a
warrant. Judges should, likewise, decide whether an officer acted
reasonably in searching or seizing without a warrant in cases such as
Terry v. Ohio, in which someone had to evaluate the conduct of
Officer McFadden, who physically stopped Terry and patted his outer
clothing for weapons.
Assuming that trial judges will continue to decide issues of police
reasonableness, what level of appellate scrutiny should their decisions
receive? As expressed by the Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United
States,211 there is a strong need for continuity and consistency in
certain Fourth Amendment decisions.212 In some cases, “[a] policy of
sweeping deference [to the trial judge] would permit, ‘[in] the
absence of any significant difference in the facts,’ ‘the Fourth
Amendment’s incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges
draw general conclusions that the facts are sufficient or insufficient . .
. .’”213 Because the policies in favor of providing bright-line guidance
to law enforcement officers are at a zenith in situations where officers
in the field must decide how to conform their actions to Fourth
Amendment demands, a de novo appellate review is appropriate for
those cases in which police conduct is evaluated for reasonableness.
Officers undertaking to search or seize in Kansas or Georgia
should abide by the same constitutional standards as officers in
Hawaii or Florida, especially given that reasonable police behaviors
can be assessed according to relatively uniform standards of conduct
and training. While there may be minor differences in the way state,
local, and federal officers train, there are numerous similarities in
police standards, making it possible for an appellate court to impose a
relatively objective and standard review of police reasonableness.
Thus, for sound policy and pragmatic reasons, issues of police
reasonableness should be assigned to judges (as they are now) and
reviewed de novo (as they are now). These mixed issues favor
uniform standards of police conduct across the United States, and
such standards are best announced by law-declaring judges.

211

517 U.S. 690 (1996).
at 697 (holding that decisions about probable cause and reasonable suspicion should
be reviewed de novo).
213 Id. at 697 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949)) (last three sets
of brackets in original). According to the Court, “[s]uch varied results would be inconsistent
with the idea of a unitary system of law.” Id.; see also id. at 697–98 (asserting that de novo
review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations will result in “a defined ‘set
of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand
as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement’” (quoting
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981))).
212 Id.
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(b) The government subset includes assessments of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion.
Most searches and seizures require probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. In turn, those standards hinge on whether “‘the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information’”214 supported the action
the officers took. Although this standard considers the officers’
knowledge, that knowledge is viewed from a “non-technical”
perspective.215
Because the reasonable suspicion and probable cause standards are
non-technical, common-sense ones, juries could decide whether a
search or seizure was supported by sufficient evidence. But, given
that the non-technical standard is framed by the knowledge and
beliefs of highly-trained officers whose experience and training shape
how a prudent officer interprets whether a citizen’s behaviors indicate
that “crime is afoot,”216 assessments of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause will benefit from a decision maker who is familiar
with law enforcement investigations. Moreover, at bottom, an
evaluation of reasonable suspicion and probable cause requires value
judgments about when officers’ actions comply with the floor
mandates of the Fourth Amendment and whether a reasonable officer
would have searched or seized. Therefore, these issues fit best within
the government subset and should be decided, in the first instance, by
fact-finding judges, as they are now. For the reasons previously
explained, judges will tend to have more exposure to information
pertinent to the methods used by and inferences drawn by prudent,
well-trained officers who conduct criminal investigations.
Presuming that determinations of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion are decided by judges (as they are currently), not juries,
should these issues also be reviewed de novo on appeal? No.
Although these issues are well-suited to review by legally-trained
decision makers, they also are highly fact-laden. Therefore, appellate
courts, including the Supreme Court, should conduct a deferential
review of the trial judge’s decision on whether reasonable suspicion
or probable cause supported a search or seizure. Despite the
Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary—that reasonable suspicion
and probable cause should be reviewed de novo—even the Court
214 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (alterations in original) (describing probable cause); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968) (stating a similar test for reasonable suspicion).
215 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
216 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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has recognized that “the mosaic which is analyzed for a
reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, ‘one
determination will seldom be a useful “precedent” for another.’”217 As
the Court has admitted, “[a] trial judge views the facts of a particular
case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community . .
. . The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and
when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference.”218
There is admittedly a need for uniform standards to announce how
much evidence equates to probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
However, these issues are so highly fact and circumstance dependent
that deference must be shown to the judge who is not only familiar
with how reasonable officers conduct their criminal investigations,
but who also sees, hears, and evaluates the evidence first-hand in light
of the “distinctive features and events of the community.”
Although uniformity may admittedly suffer, the intensely
fact-based nature of case-by-case decisions about probable cause and
reasonable suspicion makes it unlikely that a savvy attorney will be
unable to distinguish his case from appellate precedent. Therefore, the
impact of case-by-case determinations on uniformity may not be
significant. And to the extent the appellate courts perceive a weakness
in uniformity, such weaknesses can be cured with strong and clear
declarations of legal rules. For instance, if the Supreme Court
perceives that trial judges are suppressing evidence in too many car
search cases, or that trial judges are acting inconsistently in those
cases, the Court can declare a new and broad rule of law, defining
what the Fourth Amendment permits or proscribes when an officer
seeks to search a car. The Court’s holdings in Belton and Thornton
did just that. In each case, the Court announced a broad, apply-to-all
rule allowing police to search the passenger compartment of a recent
occupant’s car. Thus, after these cases, the police could be confident
that they acted constitutionally when they searched the passenger
compartment of a car, and any containers in that compartment,
contemporaneous with a lawful arrest of the car’s recent occupant.219
517 U.S. at 698 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983)).
at 699; see also id. at 701, 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the “factual details
bearing upon . . . determinations” of reasonable suspicion and probable cause favor deferential
review and that reasonable suspicion determinations are “resistant to generalization”); see also
Weiser, supra note 188 (detailing numerous cases in which trial judges assessed officers’
testimony as false).
219
See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding that when an officer makes
a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a car, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to
search the passenger compartment and any containers in the passenger compartment incident to
the lawful arrest). See also Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004) (extending the
rule of Belton to situations involving a recent occupant of a car who has walked away from the
car when officers first make contact with him).
217 Ornelas,
218 Id.
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2. The “Citizen Subset.”
The primary reason for the Court’s troublesome, even absurd,
results in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is its usurpation of the
role of the jury in a class of cases that the Supreme Court is
mismatched (if not uniquely unqualified) to decide. Specifically,
the Court reaches its most unreasonable, common-sense-defying
outcomes in cases such as Mendenhall and Drayton, which depend on
whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s circumstances would
feel free to decline to answer an officer’s questions and walk away;
those like Bustamonte and Drayton, in which the issue is whether the
suspect “voluntarily” agreed to a search;220 and cases like Oliver,
Smith, and Greenwood, in which the Court, with no societal or citizen
input, declares that a person’s actual expectation of privacy is not one
that society would recognize as reasonable.221 All of these Fourth
Amendment issues fall squarely within the citizen subset of Mixed
Reasonableness. These issues should be decided by a jury and
reviewed on appeal only for clear error.
(a) The citizen subset includes assessments of the reasonableness of a
citizen’s belief that he is constrained by an officer.
Currently, the Supreme Court decides when ordinary people would
feel free to ignore questions posed by officers and whether citizens
would feel empowered to deny officers’ requests to search their
bodies or belongings. Arguably, the Court should not be assessing
citizen reasonableness at all because the Fourth Amendment demands
reasonableness only from government actors.222 But, the legal
precedent in this area is now well-established. It requires someone,
judge or jury, to evaluate citizen behaviors and thoughts.223 Therefore,
this Article urges the Court to allow juries to conduct these
evaluations. The Court could make strides toward reaching reasonable
outcomes in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, if it would allow
citizen juries to evaluate the reasonableness of other citizens’ beliefs
and actions during their interactions and confrontations with police
officers who seek to pressure the citizens (politely or more overtly)
into submitting themselves to Fourth Amendment intrusions.
The nine Justices of the elite United States Supreme Court are
uniquely unqualified to make these evaluations of reasonableness.
discussion supra Part II.A.2.(c).
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.(b).
222 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
223 See Mendenhall discussion supra Part II.A.2.
220 See
221
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Even a cursory review of any one of the Justice’s personal and
professional accomplishments reveals how unusual his or her
background, experiences, and perspectives are compared to the
typical citizen with whom the police interact. The Justices attended
elite schools and benefit from tremendous intellect. They socialize in
influential social circles and are financially established. The
privileged circumstances and backgrounds of the nine Justices
suggest a significant disconnect between the Court and the ordinary
citizen. While almost all of the Justices are worth millions,224 the
ordinary citizen earns a very modest income.225 And, while every
Justice was educated at one of the most select colleges and law
schools, finishing at the top of his or her class,226 only twenty-nine
percent of ordinary citizens even graduate from college.227 No
surprise, the Justices are beyond knowledgeable about their rights and
their freedom to refuse an officer’s inquiries and requests to search.
But, the ordinary American feels compelled to comply with an
224 See Bernie Becker, Justices List Their Assets; Wide Range of Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2008, at A12 (reporting the Justices “wealth” based on their annual disclosures, including a
mention that Justice Thomas “received more than $1 million” in publication advances since
2003; that Justice Ginsburg reported “assets of at least $11 million”; that Justice Souter reported
assets of more than $6 million; that Chief Justice Roberts reported more than $2 million; and
that Justice Breyer, with the lowest reported assets, indicated assets “between roughly $350,000
and $750,000”). Id. (reporting the Justices annual salaries of $212,100 for the Chief Justice and
$203,000 for the associate justices).
225 See, e.g., Reuters, State of the Union 2008: By the Numbers (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS15591+29-Jan-2008+PRN20080129
(reporting that the median income of African American households in 2006 was $31,969 and
that the median income of White American households for the same period was $50,673). In
fact, the public housing population in New York earns a meager $22,119 per household. Manny
Fernandez, Public Housing Residents Face Loss of Their Community Centers, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2008, at B1.
226 Justice Alito graduated from Princeton University before attending Yale Law School,
where he served as an editor of the law review. Justice Breyer attended Stanford University,
then the University of Oxford and finally Harvard Law School, where he served as an editor of
the law review. Justice Ginsburg graduated first in her class from Cornell University and then
attended Harvard Law School, where she was a member of the law review. She ultimately
transferred to and graduated from Columbia Law School, where she also served on the law
review. Justice Kennedy attended Stanford University, spent a year at the London School of
Economics and then attended Harvard Law School. Chief Justice Roberts attended Harvard
College and Harvard Law School, where he was a managing editor of the law review. Justice
Scalia graduated first in his class from Georgetown University and then attended Harvard Law
School, where he served as an editor on the law review. Justice Souter attended Harvard College
and Harvard Law School. Justice Stevens attended college at the University of Chicago and then
went to law school at Northwestern University, where he was Editor in Chief of the law review.
Justice Thomas attended college at the College of the Holy Cross and law school at Yale
University. Oyez: Roberts Court (2006–), http://www.oyez.org/courts/roberts/robt2/ (last visited
Oct. 4, 2008).
227 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, One-Third of Young Women Have
Bachelor’s Degrees (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/education/011196.html (discussing highlights from the 2007 Current
Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement).
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officer’s demands, no matter how polite.228 From their perspective, to
refuse such a demand may lead to a search anyway or, worse,
harassment, or even brutality, depending on the circumstances.
The Justices’ perspectives of reasonableness, as expressed in the
Court’s citizen-reasonableness decisions, prove that the Justices have
little understanding of how ordinary people think and behave when
they interact with police.229 If common-sense is not proof enough, the
limited empirical evidence available shows that the Justices are out of
touch with the ordinary person’s perspectives on Fourth Amendment
autonomy and liberty.
Two professors conducted a study in which they described fifty
different search and/or seizure scenarios to human subjects.230 They
chose the scenarios based on facts in cases decided by the Supreme
Court or in lower court decisions interpreting the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment opinions.231
The participants were asked to assume, as dictated by the
Supreme Court’s caselaw, that the person who was searched
or seized (or who possessed the property being searched or
seized) was innocent. In addition, they were asked to assume
228

Nadler, supra note 9, at 155. Nadler highlights these contrasting views:

[S]ince the Court first applied the ‘totality of the circumstances’ standard to [Fourth
Amendment] consent search issues in Schneckloth v Bustamonte in 1973, it has held
in case after case, with only a few exceptions, that a reasonable person in the
situation in question either would feel free to terminate the encounter with police, or
would feel free to refuse the police request to search. By contrast, empirical studies
over the last several decades on the social psychology of compliance, conformity,
social influence, and politeness have all converged on a single conclusion: the extent
to which people feel free to refuse to comply is extremely limited under situationally
induced pressures. These situational pressures often are imperceptible to a person
experiencing them; at the same time, they can be so overwhelming that attempts to
reduce them with prophylactic warnings are insufficient.
Id. As a concrete example of how the Court’s conclusions about the voluntariness of consent
conflict with that of the ordinary citizen, Nadler references United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194 (2002). Nadler, supra note 9, at 156 (“The majority opinion in Drayton is filled with
assertions that are implausible in light of research on social influence (e.g., ‘the presence of a
holstered firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active
brandishing of the weapon’).” (quoting Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205)).
229 See Simmons, supra note 9, at 773 (contending that in deciding Fourth Amendment
consent cases “the Supreme Court remains mired in a paradigm that fails to
acknowledge the complexities of police-civilian interaction and runs against the
traditional standards of the Fourth Amendment.”). See also David K. Kessler, Free to Leave?
An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128721 (describing
the results from an empirical study in which 406 Boston residents were surveyed, revealing that
most people would not feel free to leave when questioned by police and that people under
twenty-five years of age and women feel even more constrained than others).
230 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 17, at 736.
231 Id.
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that the search or seizure was conducted by government
agents and that it was nonconsensual. They were then
requested to rate, on a scale of 0 to 100, the extent to which
they considered each method “an invasion of privacy or
autonomy,” with 0 representing “Not At All Intrusive” and
100 representing “Extremely Intrusive.”232
Although the study found some areas in which the citizens’
perspectives were generally consistent with the Court’s case
outcomes, the study also found that there was significant dissonance
in other areas.233 For instance, despite the fact that the Supreme Court
had held that police entry onto fenced-in private property outside the
curtilage of the home is not a search and that a “dog sniff” of a person
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, ordinary citizens find
these actions quite intrusive.234 And, although the Court’s case law
had held that “police efforts to detect drug smuggling by singling out
a passenger on a bus and asking if his luggage may be searched either
is not a seizure or is only a minimal one,” the subjects in the study
ranked the intrusiveness a “44,” quite high on the intrusiveness
scale.235
It should be no surprise that the perspectives of the Justices are out
of touch. Extensive sociological research into how jurors make
decisions shows that each juror relies on his or her own life
experiences to organize information and evidence presented during a
trial or hearing. The juror then organizes the information “into what
for her is the most plausible account of what happened.”236 Because
the Justices’ experiences and perspectives are so different from those
of the typical citizen, their organization of information and the
inferences they draw from it will be very different from those of more
ordinary people.237 Thus, the Court’s perspectives, as reflected in its
case outcomes, are a poor indicator of the realities that ordinary
citizens face when they interact with the police.
(footnote omitted).
at 739–40.
234 Id. at 740. In the study, “both of these police actions received fairly high rankings (R =
21 and R = 23, respectively).” Id.
235 Id. at 742. See also Kessler, supra note 229 (reporting the results of an empirical study
of 406 Boston residents, seeking to determine whether ordinary people feel free to leave when
confronted by police, and showing that the Supreme Court’s decisions are inconsistent with the
beliefs of ordinary citizens).
236 Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects
of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 78 (1993).
237 See Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters,” supra note 76, at 250 (contending both that
the Supreme Court’s decisions about the perspectives of the average, hypothetical person are
“out of touch” and that an encounter between an officer and “a black male” are different from
encounters between “the so-called” average person and the police).
232 Id.
233 Id.
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As a result of the Court’s atypical perspectives on how citizens
respond to police, the Court reaches absurd case outcomes that any
ordinary citizen, including thousands of law students each year who
study criminal procedure for the first time, knows are factually
baseless—like the one in Mendenhall238 that says a reasonable
twenty-two-year-old uneducated black woman would feel free to
reject the “requests” of two armed white male law enforcement agents
to answer questions and go with them to a private room in the airport.
Of course, there is no guarantee that the findings of every citizen
jury will parallel how the average, ordinary citizen perceives a police
event either. But, even if juries demand great fortitude from suspects
and others,239 allowing them to impose such strict standards will
instill a confidence in a pronouncement of reasonableness that is
lacking when nine elite Justices impose their view of
reasonableness, while sitting far removed from the anxiety the typical
citizen experiences when interacting with the police.240 In any event,
it is difficult to imagine that citizen juries could reach results that are
more common-sense defying than many the Court has issued.
Furthermore, juries will be able to assess the credibility of the
citizen/defendant and the local officers first-hand, observing their
demeanors and non-verbal signals for lies or truth.241 Finally, juries
238

Discussed supra Part II.A.2.(a).(i).
show that a typical citizen would hold others to high standards of reasonable
behavior. See Nadler, supra note 9, at 168–72.
240 See, e.g., discussion of United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), and United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), supra Part II.A.2.(a).(i). & (iii); see also Andrew M.
Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of “Apprendi-land”: Statutory Minimums and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 451 (2002) (contending that a jury is
the “conscience of the community” in the context of discussing sentencing); Jeffrey A. Meyer,
Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 178–79
(2007) (arguing for an increased role for juries to “resolve a particular defendant’s knowledge of
wrongfulness” because a jury has “a far broader range of views and life experiences” and
because juries reflect more accurately the experiences of the community as a whole); Kevin K.
Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2338 (2008) (arguing for an
increased role for the grand jury and contending that such an expanded role would comport with
the ideals of the founders of the country by allowing citizens from the same community who
faced similar circumstances and hardships to decide whether to charge a defendant with a
crime); id. at 2340–41 (discussing the many benefits of citizen juries to the criminal justice
system, including to 1) “imbue criminal justice with a democratic element;” 2) promote the
“voice” and “pulse” of the community; 3) give the community “an important role in the
provision of criminal justice;” 4) promote the community’s “confidence” in the outcome of
justice; and 5) and provide, maybe, “a better sense of justice than a judge” (citations omitted)).
241 See Pettys, supra note 187, at 1629 (“When deciding which inferences to draw from the
evidence and how to cast their votes, jurors typically try to construct a narrative that
satisfactorily accounts for all of the credible evidence they have seen and heard.” (citing Reid
Hastie, Emotions in Jurors’ Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 994 (2001))); see also id. at
1628 (arguing that “demeanor” serves “as a reasonably reliable basis for determining whether a
speaker is deceptive” and that observers can successfully detect lies by listening for an increase
“in the pitch of one’s tone of voice, increased hesitancy in one’s speech, and an increase in the
239 Studies
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can and should take into account any community and societal factors
that affect how citizens normally interact with the police. As the
Supreme Court has previously acknowledged in other criminal
contexts, the purpose of a citizen jury is “to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community.”242
A 2007 case from the Ninth Circuit illustrates the importance of
unique societal and cultural influences in Fourth Amendment cases.
In United States v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit took into account
“[r]ecent relations between police and the African-American
community in Portland[, Oregon]” in analyzing whether an
African-American man was “seized” without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion when he “consented” to a search of his car that
revealed a gun.243 In finding that the man’s consent to the search was
not voluntary, the court considered the “totality of the circumstances,”
including the fact that, “in the one and a half years before [the officer]
initiated contact with [the suspect], there were two well-publicized
incidents where white Portland police officers, during traffic stops,
shot, and in one instance killed, African-American Portland
citizens.”244 In other words, the Ninth Circuit correctly found
pertinent the fact that racial tensions between the police and
African-American citizens had spawned a publicity campaign urging
African-Americans to comply with the directives of police, and that
these facts contributed to the defendant’s reasonable belief that he
was not free to decline requests of the officer to consent.
Such facts and circumstances unique to the community or
individual citizen are exactly the sorts of influences a citizen jury can
evaluate better than the Supreme Court Justices, who must consider
the encounter on a cold, written record far removed from the events of
the day.
(b)The citizen subset includes assessments of consent.
Issues of Fourth Amendment consent also fall within the citizen
subset; therefore, juries, not judges, should decide these citizen-based
issues with accompanying deferential, clear-error review on appeal.

number of grammatical and other speech errors”).
242
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
243 490 F.3d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Recent Case, supra note 209, at 1669
(describing the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of the “racialized community-police tension” as “a
subtle but significant step” toward bringing the court’s analysis in line with important Fourth
Amendment principles).
244 Washington, 490 F.3d. at 768.
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(i) Actual consent.
Juries should listen to testimony, make credibility determinations,
and draw any necessary inferences about the voluntariness and the
scope of a citizen or suspect’s purported agreement to allow an officer
to impinge on his Fourth Amendment freedoms. Juries are perfectly
suited to set standards of reasonableness, reflecting the amount of
pressure an ordinary person must endure before his or her “consent”
is deemed to be coerced. As explained in Part III.C.2.(a), the Court’s
perspectives about the fortitude and savvy of ordinary citizens are out
of touch.245 And, consent cases make up about 90 percent or more of
the Fourth Amendment searches in this country.246 Thus, in a large
part of Fourth Amendment cases, the Court is holding ordinary
citizens to standards that typical, prudent people cannot meet.247 The
result? The purpose of the Fourth Amendment—to protect the people
against undue government intrusions—is undermined when the Court
inaccurately assesses the validity of consent, effectively denying
Fourth Amendment protection to citizens.
(ii) Apparent consent.
Apparent consent cases are tough to classify as fitting within the
government or citizen subset. As the Court’s precedent stands now,
the reasonableness of an officer’s beliefs248 is the key factor. If an
officer reasonably believes that someone consented to a search, the
search is valid, even if the person had no real authority to permit the
search.249 Therefore, apparent consent issues arguably fall within the
government subset of Mixed Reasonableness because they require an
245 See Nadler, supra note 9, at 188. Nadler argues that “[p]erceived coercion is determined
by the speaker's authority and the speaker's language working together. Because authorities such
as police officers direct the actions of others, the listener is likely to conclude that an utterance
is in fact a directive, or an order to be followed.” Id. Thus, Nadler explains that “citizens
generally do not interpret ‘Can I please see your license and registration?’ as spoken by a police
officer as a genuine request; it is a command, and everyone understands this.”); see also Wilson
v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896) ( “When there is a conflict of evidence as to whether
a confession is or is not voluntary, if the ceurt [sic] decides that it is admissible, the question
may be left to the jury with the direction that they should reject the confession if upon the whole
evidence they are satisfied it was not the voluntary act of the defendant.”).
246 Simmons, supra note 9, at 773.
247 See Nadler, supra note 9, at 201–02 (recounting a survey in which motorists who had
been asked to consent to a search of their cars after being stopped by police for a traffic
violation reported an overwhelming amount of compliance, including that forty-nine out of the
fifty-four respondents agreed to let the police search and only five refused (citing Illya D.
Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry into the “Consensual”
Police-Citizen Encounter (unpublished doctoral thesis))).
248 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
249 Id.
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assessment of whether a well-trained law enforcement officer acts
reasonably by conducting a search based on information that he
thought gave him lawful permission to search or seize without a
warrant or legal cause. In reality, however, the Court should be
evaluating the reasonableness of both the officer’s belief that consent
was given by someone with the power to agree, and the reasonable
actions and beliefs of the citizen whose body or belongings were
impacted.
A better approach would be for the Supreme Court to recognize
that apparent consent cases require considerable evaluation of the
reasonableness of citizen behaviors. For example, the Rodriguez
case250 looks anything but reasonable to an ordinary citizen, let alone
to scholars of the Fourth Amendment and contracts law, because the
Court should have considered whether a citizen subjected to the
officer’s Fourth Amendment intrusion was reasonable in believing
that he was entitled to privacy, not simply whether a law enforcement
officer reasonably believed that he was authorized to conduct a
warrantless search without probable cause. In other words, because
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect citizens against
undue government intrusion, the Court should be concerned about
whether the citizen had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
private space searched, given that he or she never gave the
government permission to enter or search the premises. Because
apparent consent cases are more citizen-oriented than the Court has
acknowledged, this category of mixed issues should be assigned to
the citizen subset and left to juries to determine with accompanying
deferential review on appeal.
(c) The citizen subset includes assessments of whether an officer
conducted a search.
When the Court decides whether a Fourth Amendment “search”
has occurred, it asks: 1) “whether the individual, by his
conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,’” that is, whether he “has shown that ‘he [sought] to preserve
[something] as private;’”251 and 2) “whether the individual’s
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.’”252 While the first part of the test is a matter of Factual
Reasonableness, the second inquiry is a matter of Mixed
discussion supra Part II.A.2.(c).(ii)..
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351, 361 (1967) (second brackets in original)).
252 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 740).
250 See

251 Smith
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Reasonableness, which deserves further analysis because such
questions could be answered by either trial judge or jury.
A jury could certainly speak to society’s expectations of privacy to
the extent that societal expectations are necessarily formed by
citizens.253 On the other hand, a jury’s assessment of societal
expectations will be influenced by the unique flavor of the specific
community and culture where the jury sits, as well as the individual
notions of the members of the particular jury. Differences between
cultures and communities will tend to result in a patchwork of
heterogeneous views about when expectations of privacy are
reasonable.254 Therefore, a jury will be less likely than appellate
judges to render decisions reflecting a “national” and uniform view of
societal expectations.
Ideally, “societal” expectations would reflect notions of all of
society and be uniform enough for officers to decide what is and is
not a search. Moreover, because decisions about whether police
action impacts a reasonable expectation of privacy are “contingent
upon value judgments and political choices about what ought to be
done,”255 assessments of reasonable expectation of privacy could
logically be left to judges. The desire to set uniform and national
standards to guide all law enforcement agents, whether they seek to
search a seashore home in Bangor, Maine, or a country estate in
Moultrie, Georgia, is understandable. The Supreme Court has
certainly spoken favorably of such values and of the significance of
bright-line rules to guide law enforcement officers.256
253 See Luna, supra note 9, at 840 (asserting that “[t]he sentiment is widely held” that
“there is something wrong” with the Court’s threshold measure for whether the Fourth
Amendment is implicated and noting the “dismay that can accompany [law school] class
discussions about warrantless perusal of personal bank records, for example, or agents
trespassing on private land. It can be disconcerting to learn that such action may not even be a
‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment.”); id. at 856 (“[J]uries would not be required to either
guesstimate or mystically channel the expectations of society, as seems to occur at the Supreme
Court. If jurors are drawn from a fair cross-section of the community—in terms of race, gender,
socioeconomic background, and so on—their collective expectations, aggregated through a
process of group decision-making, should represent those of society (or at least those of the
relevant jurisdiction).”).
254 See Bacigal, Putting the People Back, supra note 11, at 410 (“Although the jury is an
appropriate entity for identifying what is usually done in the community and thus what is
reasonable, the jury has no preeminent claim to determining justifiable and legitimate
expectations of privacy or liberty, because such determinations are contingent upon value
judgments and political choices about what ought to be done.”).
255 Id.
256 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (noting the need for a “‘set of rules
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to
whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement’” (quoting Wayne
R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697
(1996) (noting the importance of uniform rules to “a unitary system of law”).
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Despite the apparent logic of allowing appellate judges (and
ultimately the Supreme Court) to define societal expectations of
privacy, in reality, the practice has failed. It has failed to protect
citizens from unreasonable government intrusions of privacy and
liberty, and it has led the Court to render numerous case outcomes
that defy society’s real expectations of privacy. Perhaps the best
evidence of the Court’s failings is found in the empirical study
conducted by Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher,
documenting that while the Supreme Court deems certain police
actions—like dog sniffs and police entry onto fenced-in-private
property outside the curtilege of the home—to be “non-searches”
with no Fourth Amendment implications, ordinary citizens find
these actions quite intrusive and, thus, contrary to reasonable
expectations of privacy.257
Because the Court’s test for defining a Fourth Amendment search
necessarily depends on how ordinary, prudent citizens interpret
reasonable expectations of privacy, juries of reasonable citizens
should be assigned to give meaning to this standard on a case-by-case
basis.
D. What the Critics May Say About the Proposal.
Like any proposal for a change in the way the Supreme Court
processes cases, this Article is likely to draw criticism. Two
arguments seem particularly likely. Nay-sayers are sure to contend
that the proposal will undercut the bright-line guidance that police
officers need to ensure their compliance with the Constitution, and
they will probably worry that using juries will prove to be time
consuming and expensive.
1. The murkier guidance argument.
The Court has often emphasized the need for bright-line rules to
guide law enforcement officers who must decide in dynamic contexts
whether their acts will violate the Fourth Amendment.258 Arguably,
the Court has stressed the importance of bright-line rules at the
expense of substantive rights protection. After all, the Fourth
Amendment guarantees citizens that the government will not engage
in unreasonable searches, not that law enforcement officers will be
free from tough choices about whether or not to search or seize. But,
257
See
258

Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 17 at 740.
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) (expressing a desire for a
“straightforward rule” so persons can know the scope of their constitutional protections and
officers can know the scope of their authority).
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admittedly, to protect the rights of citizens, the Court must issue
decisions that warn officers about what is and is not permissible.259
In most instances, the current proposal should not impair the
Court’s ability to afford plain directives about constitutional
versus unconstitutional police behaviors. It merely shifts from
Justices to juries some of the responsibility to decide the issues
that are necessarily unpredictable. Because an evaluation of
citizen reasonableness involves subjectivity and some level of
unpredictability, no matter who evaluates the issues, predictability
in these cases should not improve or suffer significantly. And,
should too much inconsistency result, the Supreme Court can, in
the appropriate case, declare a new, broad-based, apply-to-all rule
of law to govern all subsequent cases presenting such issues.
Furthermore, even assuming some loss in consistency, the benefits
of the proposed procedures arguably exceed the costs. Citizen
juries assessing citizen reasonableness will have an important and
much-needed positive impact on Fourth Amendment cases generally.
The Court’s credibility with the public will improve. No longer will
the Court’s citizen-based decisions defy common sense, appear
result-oriented, and be described as “an embarrassment.”260 Thus,
while predictability in most cases will neither improve nor suffer, and
in others may suffer somewhat, other aspects of the Court’s
jurisprudence will benefit under the proposed change in process,
minimizing the overall impact of the loss in predictable outcomes and
maximizing other values of a fair system of criminal justice.
2. Juries are time consuming and expensive argument.
Critics are sure to say that juries will prove to be cumbersome,
time consuming, and expensive. Use of a jury does not have to be
either cumbersome or time-consuming, and the benefits of a
citizen jury (even assuming additional monetary expense)
outweigh a small or even a moderate increase in convenience and
speed of decision. As Professor Bacigal and others have already
suggested, “a single panel could consider pretrial motions to
suppress in numerous cases, and except for the presence of a jury,
the proceedings would otherwise resemble current motions to
suppress.”261 The jury panels would resemble grand juries in that
259
See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981) (“When a person cannot know
how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot
know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his
authority.”).
260
Amar, supra note 6, at 757.
261 Bacigal, Putting the People Back, supra note 11, at 424 (citing George C. Thomas, III
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they would convene to hear multiple cases and would gather
expertise with each one. Thus, the cumbersome and
time-consumption arguments are probably overblown, especially
given that the criminal system already effectively uses citizen
juries.
Admittedly, though, juries will cost more than the current non-jury
suppression process. The short response to this criticism is that
constitutional rights protection is worth the cost. The Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has been described as “an
embarrassment,” and the citizens’ privacy and liberty rights are
suffering. The sole purpose of the Fourth Amendment—to protect the
citizenry from unreasonable government searches and seizures—has
been undermined using the current process. Such important rights are
worth the added administrative expense. As the Supreme Court noted
in evaluating the constitutionality of Michigan’s college admission
standards, “administrative challenges” don’t excuse an otherwise
unconstitutional process.262 The same principle holds true for ensuring
that citizens’ fundamental Fourth Amendment rights are adequately
protected with a fair and effective process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court applies a single balancing test to assess Fourth
Amendment rights, regardless of whether the Court is evaluating the
reasonableness of a well-trained and experienced police officer’s
actions and beliefs, or the reasonable thoughts and behaviors of a
scared, twenty-two-year-old African-American female confronted by
a group of white, armed DEA agents. Because the Court applies a
one-size-fits-all approach to every Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry, the Court has sometimes reached results that are anything
but.
Although there is no recipe for defining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, the Court produces its most anomalous Fourth
Amendment outcomes when it decides “mixed” questions of

& Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights From a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment,
73 B. U. L. Rev. 147, 182–83 (1993)). This Article does not seek to explore the particular
makeup of the juries that would be assigned to hear Fourth Amendment suppression issues.
Nevertheless, it will be important to ensure a large enough panel of jurors and limit the length of
their service so that each suppression issue receives the full benefits of the citizen jury. One
major benefit of the citizen jury is that its diversity brings with it broader perspectives and
arguably better decision-making. A second major benefit of the citizen jury is that citizens will
not be jaded on the issues nor biased (as a whole) for or against the police.
262
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
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reasonableness, assessing issues that turn on how ordinary, prudent
citizens think and behave. The Court treats these mixed issues,
combinations of fact and law, as if they raise purely legal questons.
But mixed issues are more complex and require someone to
determine historical facts, apply those facts to principles of Fourth
Amendment law, and consider the totality of the circumstances,
including taking into account community and cultural influences. The
Supreme Court will take its first step toward returning reasonableness
to its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by expressly, accurately, and
consistently dividing “mixed issues” into subgroups and then
assigning whole subgroups to judge or jury, depending on who can
best decide the whole class of issues in a way that protects the
interests represented by the Fourth Amendment.
Dividing mixed questions into identifiable sub-categories, a
government subset and a citizen subset, is the key to returning reason
to the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Until now, the Court
has reserved all mixed issues for itself, subjecting them to a de novo
review on appeal. At a minimum, the Court should distinguish
between questions that are strongly tied to law enforcement policies
and procedures or dependent on the professional expertise of law
enforcement agents and, in contrast, questions that require an
evaluation of how a prudent and sensible suspect or citizen acts and
thinks when he or she is confronted by the police.
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